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LADY BLACK, LORD BRIGGS, LADY ARDEN AND LORD HAMBLEN
■ | Mr. Fowler was a qualified diver, resident in the Republic of South Africa. During the 2011/12 and 2012/13 tax years he undertook diving engagements in the waters of the UK Continental Shelf. Although his status had yet to be determined, the preliminary issue which was subject of this appeal required it to be assumed that he undertook those engagements as an employee, rather than as a self-employed contractor. | |
■ | HMRC claimed, but Mr. Fowler denied, that the income which he earned from those diving engagements was subject to UK taxation. That depended on how the double taxation treaty between the UK and South Africa would applied to a person in his position. In a nutshell, the Treaty provides for employment income to be taxed in the place where it is earned, in the present case in the UK, but for the earnings of self-employed persons to be taxed only where they are resident, in Mr. Fowler's case in South Africa. If (as was to be assumed) Mr. Fowler was an employee, then he should be taxable only in the UK. | |
■ | But the matter was complicated by two factors. The first was that employed divers doing the particular kind of diving work in UK waters which Mr. Fowler did are, under UK tax law, to be treated as if they were self-employed for income tax purposes. The second was that terms used in the Treaty, if not defined in the Treaty itself, are to be given the meaning which they have in the tax law, or the general law, of the state seeking to recover tax, here the UK. Thus, if the effect of the UK tax law's requirement to treat Mr. Fowler as if he was self-employed is to govern the meaning of relevant terms in the Treaty, the outcome might be that he was to be treated as self-employed under the Treaty, and therefore taxable, if at all, in South Africa. | |
■ | This was the conclusion of the majority in the Court of Appeal, from which HMRC appeals to this court. In fact, such an outcome could mean that Mr. Fowler was not taxable in either country, because the question whether he was taxable in South Africa would not be governed by the meaning of Treaty terms established by reference to UK tax law. He would probably be treated in South Africa as an employee. To the extent that domestic South African tax legislation did not tax the earnings of residents employed abroad he would not be taxable there or in the UK. | |
■ | Issue(s) arose as to whether article 7 (on business profits) of the UK-South africa DTC or article 14 of the said DTC (on income from employment) would apply for the purpose of allocating taxing rights in respect of remuneration for services provided by a diver in the UK under a contract of employment. |
■ | Article 3(2) is a definition provision, but there is no definition of employment. | |
■ | Looking at article 3 of the Treaty as a whole, the following points may be noted. First, paragraph (2) provides an "always speaking" means of ascertaining the meaning of terms in the Treaty which are undefined therein. It is always speaking because it requires meaning to be ascertained by reference to the national law of a Contracting State 'at that time', that is at the time when the Treaty falls to be applied. Secondly, the 'terms' of the Treaty which fall to be given meaning for the purposes of this appeal are 'employment', 'business' and 'enterprise'. 'Employment' is not a defined term, so that article 3(2) applies to it with full force. But 'enterprise' is defined, and "business" has a partial definition, in both cases in article 3(1). [Para 9] | |
■ | Article 7 is concerned with business profits. [Para 10] | |
■ | Applying the definitions in article 3(1) if Mr. Fowler had been, within the meaning of the Treaty, carrying on an enterprise by his diving activities on the UK continental shelf, it would nonetheless have been an enterprise of South Africa and the profits taxable (if at all) there. This is because it is common ground that he had no permanent establishment in the UK. [Para 11] | |
■ | Article 14 is about income from employment. | |
■ | It is to be noted that article 14(1) does not prohibit the state in which an employee is resident from taxing him on his income earned abroad. It merely permits (but does not require) the state where he is working to tax him. In such a case article 21 then avoids double taxation, by requiring the state where the employee is resident to give credit for the tax paid in the state where he works. Nonetheless states may choose, in certain circumstances, not to tax resident employees on all or part of their foreign earnings. [Para 12] | |
■ | Article 17 deals with pensions and annuities. [Para 13] | |
■ | The OECD Commentary recognises that in different states, the national law may focus on either the form or on the substance of the relationship (paras 8.2 - 8.7). At para 8.7 it is acknowledged that the domestic law of the state applying the likely to prevail, but subject to two qualifications. The first is that the context may require otherwise (see again para 8.7). This qualification is of course expressly made in article 3(2) of the Treaty. The second qualification (expressed in para 8.11) is that the conclusion that, under domestic law, a formal contractual relationship should be disregarded must, however, be arrived at on the basis of objective criteria. For instance, a State could not argue that services are deemed, under its domestic law, to constitute employment services where, under the relevant facts and circumstances, it clearly appears that these services are rendered under a contract for the provision of services concluded between two separate enterprises. ... Conversely, where services rendered by an individual may properly be regarded by a State as rendered in an employment relationship rather than as under a contract for services concluded between two enterprises, that State should logically also consider that the individual is not carrying on the business of the enterprise that constitutes that individual's formal employer…" [Para 17] | |
■ | The OECD Commentaries are updated from time-to-time, so that they may (and do in the present case) post-date a particular double taxation treaty. Nonetheless they are to be given such persuasive force as aids to interpretation as the cogency of their reasoning deserves: Existing UK authority gives some relevant general guidance on the interpretation of double taxation treaties. In Comrs for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v. Anson [2015] STC 1777 this court article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires a treaty to be interpreted 'in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'. It is accordingly the ordinary (contextual) meaning which is relevant. [Para 18] | |
■ | The relevant UK tax legislation | |
■ | Tax on the earnings of employees is regulated by the Income-tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 ('ITEPA'). Section 4 defines 'employment'. [Para 20] | |
■ | Sections 6 and 7 of ITEPA deal with employment income. The Tax Acts referred to in section 7(1) include ITEPA and ITTOIA. [Para 21] | |
■ | Section 15, dealing with the income of certain divers and diving supervisors is central to this appeal. | |
■ | Certain points about section 15 are plain, and common ground. First, it only applies to a particular class of employed divers, whose employment income would otherwise be taxable under ITEPA. Secondly, the types of divers covered are defined by reference to a particular kind of diving, and only if undertaken in UK or related waters. Thirdly, it may therefore apply only to part of the activities of divers under a particular contract of employment, since they might also be engaged to do other types of diving as well, or diving of the specified type in other waters. [Para 24] | |
■ | The reason for this particular tax treatment of this class of divers was a matter of some debate in submissions before this court. But the FtT found that it was because, at least at the time of the enactment of the precursor to section 15, section 29 of the Finance Act 1978, this class of divers commonly incurred their own costs, and therefore deserved the more generous expenses regime afforded to the self-employed, by comparison with employees. The FtT relied on an opinion to that effect published by the Office of Tax Simplification in March 2011, in preference to broader but less persuasive observations by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury in February 1978 when announcing the intention to introduce section 29: Hansard (HC Debates), 3 February 1978, written answers, col 359. There is no good reason to doubt that essentially factual finding by the FtT. It is clear that it was not a purpose of the deeming provision in section 15(2) to resolve some legal or factual uncertainty about whether such divers were genuinely employed or self-employed. On the contrary, section 15 applies only to employed divers. [Para 25] | |
■ | ITTOIA contains two other deeming provisions similar to section 15(2), in section 9(1) relating to farming and market gardening and in section 12(2) relating to the profits of mines and quarries. But neither of these provisions, or their underlying purposes, shed useful light on the issues in this appeal. [Para 26] | |
■ | There are useful but not conclusive dicta in reported authorities about the way in which, in general, statutory deeming provisions ought to be interpreted and applied. They include the following guidance, which has remained consistent over many years: |
(1) | The extent of the fiction created by a deeming provision is primarily a matter of construction of the statute in which it appears. | |
(2) | For that purpose the court should ascertain, if it can, the purposes for which and the persons between whom the statutory fiction is to be resorted to, and then apply the deeming provision that far, but not where it would produce effects clearly outside those purposes. | |
(3) | But those purposes may be difficult to ascertain, and Parliament may not find it easy to prescribe with precision the intended limits of the artificial assumption which the deeming provision requires to be made. | |
(4) | A deeming provision should not be applied so far as to produce unjust, absurd or anomalous results, unless the court is compelled to do so by clear language. | |
(5) | But the court should not shrink from applying the fiction created by the deeming provision to the consequences which would inevitably flow from the fiction being real. [Para 27] |
■ | Mr. Fowler sought to persue that section 15 of ITTOIA compels us to treat a qualifying diver as carrying on a trade for all purposes under UK income tax law and therefore also under the Treaty as required by article 3(2), with the result that article 7 rather than article 14 applies to the taxation of his earnings. [Para 28] | |
■ | However, the Court had reached the opposite conclusion. The starting point is that the question which of articles 7 and 14 of the Treaty applies to Mr. Fowler's diving activities depends upon the true construction of those articles, in the context of the Treaty as a whole and its purposes, with the meaning of terms within those articles ascertained as required by article 3(2) by reference to UK income tax law. The relevant terms are, in article 7, 'profits' and 'enterprise of a contracting state' and, in article 14, 'salaries, wages and other similar remuneration' and 'employment'. [Para 29] | |
■ | Nothing in the Treaty requires articles 7 and 14 to be applied to the fictional, deemed world which may be created by UK income tax legislation. Rather they are to be applied to the real world, unless the effect of article 3(2) is that a deeming provision alters the meaning which relevant terms of the Treaty would otherwise have. This much is confirmed by paragraph 8(11) of the OECD Commentary quoted above, and it would be contrary to the requirement to treat the Treaty as a bilateral international agreement to do otherwise, as required by the dicta in the Anson case. Were it not for section 15 of ITTOIA, there would be no doubt that article 14, not article 7, would apply to Mr. Fowler's diving activities, at least on the necessary but as yet untested assumption that he really was an employee. The meaning of "employment" is laid down in section 4 of ITEPA, and his remuneration plainly constitutes employment income within sections 6 and 7. UK tax law would not regard him as making profits from a trade, or his business as being that of an establishment. [Para 30] | |
■ | So the question is whether section 15 gives a different meaning to the relevant terms. That is not how a deeming provision works generally, nor does section 15(2) in particular. Section 15(1) uses 'employment' and 'employment income' in exactly the same way as is prescribed by sections 4, 6 and 7 of ITEPA, and the phrase "performance of the duties of employment" in section 15(2) again uses "employment" in the same way. Section 15 is about the taxation of income arising from the performance of those duties of employment but, introduced by the word 'instead', provides that the income is to be taxed as if, contrary to the fact, it was profits of a trade. [Para 31] | |
■ | Section 15 also uses 'trade' in its conventional sense and does not therefore alter the meaning of 'enterprise' in article 7, it being common ground that enterprise is descriptive of a business, and that business includes trade. In short, nothing in section 15 purports to alter the settled meaning of the relevant terms of the Treaty, viewed from the perspective of UK tax law. Rather it takes the usual meaning of those terms as its starting point, and erects a fiction which, applying those terms in their usual meaning, leads to a different way of recovering income tax from qualifying divers. [Para 32] | |
■ | Furthermore section 15 creates this fiction not for the purpose of deciding whether qualifying employed divers are to be taxed in the UK upon their employment income, but for the purpose of adjusting how that income is to be taxed, specifically by allowing a more generous regime for the deduction of expenses. This appears clearly from the express language of section 6(5) of ITEPA, which recognises that the income being charged to tax under section 15 is indeed employment income. If one asks, as is required, for what purposes and between whom is the fiction created, it is plainly not for the purpose of rendering a qualifying diver immune from tax in the UK, nor adjudicating between the UK and South Africa as the potential recipient of tax. It is for the purpose of adjusting the basis of a continuing UK income tax liability which arises from the receipt of employment income. Therefore to apply the deeming provision in section 15(2) so as to alter the meaning of terms in the Treaty with the result of rendering a qualifying diver immune from UK taxation would be contrary to its purpose. It would also produce an anomalous result. [Para 33] | |
■ | Nor should article 3(2) of the Treaty be construed so as to bring a qualifying diver within article 7 rather than article 14. To do so would be contrary to the purposes of the Treaty. This is because, as is recognised by article 2(1), the Treaty is not concerned with the manner in which taxes falling within the scope of the Treaty are levied. Section 15, understood in the light of section 6(5) of ITEPA, charges income tax on the employment income of an employed diver, but in a particular manner which includes the fiction that the diver is carrying on a trade. [Para 34] | |
■ | For those reasons the appeal is to be allowed. [Para 35] |
** | ** | ** |
(a) | pensions and other similar remuneration paid in consideration of past employment, and | |
(b) | any annuity paid, |
(1) | In the employment income Parts 'employment' includes in particular - |
(a) | any employment under a contract of service, | |
(b) | any employment under a contract of apprenticeship, and | |
(c) | any employment in the service of the Crown. |
(2) | In those Parts 'employed', 'employee' and 'employer' have corresponding meanings." |
(a) | general earnings, and | |
(b) | specific employment income. |
(1) | This section applies if - |
(a) | a person performs the duties of employment as a diver or diving supervisor in the United Kingdom or in any area designated by Order in Council under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (c 29), | |
(b) | the duties consist wholly or mainly of seabed diving activities, and | |
(c) | any employment income from the employment would otherwise be chargeable to tax under Part 2 of ITEPA 2003. |
(2) | The performance of the duties of employment is instead treated for income tax purposes as the carrying on of a trade in the United Kingdom. | |
(3) | For the purposes of this section the following are seabed diving activities - |
(a) | taking part as a diver in diving operations concerned with the exploration or exploitation of the seabed, its subsoil and their natural resources, and | |
(b) | acting as a diving supervisor in relation to any such diving operations." |
(1) | The extent of the fiction created by a deeming provision is primarily a matter of construction of the statute in which it appears. | |
(2) | For that purpose the court should ascertain, if it can, the purposes for which and the persons between whom the statutory fiction is to be resorted to, and then apply the deeming provision that far, but not where it would produce effects clearly outside those purposes. | |
(3) | But those purposes may be difficult to ascertain, and Parliament may not find it easy to prescribe with precision the intended limits of the artificial assumption which the deeming provision requires to be made. | |
(4) | A deeming provision should not be applied so far as to produce unjust, absurd or anomalous results, unless the court is compelled to do so by clear language. | |
(5) | But the court should not shrink from applying the fiction created by the deeming provision to the consequences which would inevitably flow from the fiction being real. As Lord Asquith memorably put it in East End Dwellings Co Ltd v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952] AC 109, at 133: | |
"The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." |
***
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