OECD Model Commentary - Article 1
***
Contact us and speak with an international tax lawyer: https://yourinternationaltaxlawyers.net
Discover our courses
COURSE 1 TAX HAVENS COURSE - GOING GLOBAL COURSE - BUSINESS INTERNATIONALIZATION COURSE
https://yourinternationaltaxlawyers.net/index.php/course-1
COURSE 2 Learn 10 hidden strategies used by elites and multimillionaires to reduce their taxes, and start saving taxes right NOW, even without moving abroad
https://yourinternationaltaxlawyers.net/index.php/course-2
***
COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 1
Paragraph 1
1. Whereas many conventions concluded in the first part of the 20th century were applicable to "citizens" of the Contracting States, conventions concluded afterwards almost always apply to "residents" of one or both of the Contracting States irrespective of nationality. That approach is reflected in paragraph 1. The term "resident" is defined in Article 4. The fact that a person is a resident of a Contracting State does not mean, however, that the person is automatically entitled to the benefits of the Convention since some or all of these benefits may be denied under various provisions of the Convention, including those of Article 29.
(Amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Paragraph 2
2. This paragraph addresses the situation of the income of entities or arrangements that one or both Contracting States treat as wholly or partly fiscally transparent for tax purposes. The provisions of the paragraph ensure that income of such entities or arrangements is treated, for the purposes of the Convention, in accordance with the principles reflected in the 1999 report of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships". That report therefore provides guidance and examples on how the provision should be interpreted and applied in various situations.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
3. The report, however, dealt exclusively with partnerships and whilst the Committee recognised that many of the principles included in the report could also apply with respect to other non-corporate entities, it expressed the intention to examine the application of the Model Tax Convention to these other entities at a later stage. As indicated in paragraph 37 of the report, the Committee was particularly concerned with "cases where domestic tax laws create intermediary situations where a partnership is partly treated as a taxable unit and partly disregarded for tax purposes." According to the report
Whilst this may create practical difficulties with respect to a very limited number of partnerships, it is a more important problem in the case of other entities such as trusts. For this reason, the Committee decided to deal with this issue in the context of follow-up work to this report.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
4. Paragraph 2 addresses this particular situation by referring to entities that are "wholly or partly" treated as fiscally transparent. Thus, the paragraph not only serves to confirm the conclusions of the Partnership Report but also extends the application of these conclusions to situations that were not directly covered by the report (subject to the application of specific provisions dealing with collective investment vehicles, see paragraphs 22 to 48 below).
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
5. The paragraph not only ensures that the benefits of the Convention are granted in appropriate cases but also ensures that these benefits are not granted where neither Contracting State treats, under its domestic law, the income of an entity or arrangement as the income of one of its residents. The paragraph therefore confirms the conclusions of the report in such a case (see, for example, example 3 of the report). Also, as recognised in the report, States should not be expected to grant the benefits of a bilateral tax convention in cases where they cannot verify whether a person is truly entitled to these benefits. Thus, if an entity is established in a jurisdiction from which a Contracting State cannot obtain tax information, that State would need to be provided with all the necessary information in order to be able to grant the benefits of the Convention. In such a case, the Contracting State might well decide to use the refund mechanism for the purposes of applying the benefits of the Convention even though it normally applies these benefits at the time of the payment of the relevant income. In most cases, however, it will be possible to obtain the relevant information and to apply the benefits of the Convention at the time the income is taxed (see for example paragraphs 43 to 45 below which discuss a similar issue in the context of collective investment vehicles).
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6. The following example illustrates the application of the paragraph:
Example: State A and State B have concluded a treaty identical to the Model Tax Convention. State A considers that an entity established in State B is a company and taxes that entity on interest that it receives from a debtor resident in State A. Under the domestic law of State B, however, the entity is treated as a partnership and the two members in that entity, who share equally all its income, are each taxed on half of the interest. One of the members is a resident of State B and the other one is a resident of a country with which States A and B do not have a treaty. The paragraph provides that in such case, half of the interest shall be considered, for the purposes of Article 11, to be income of a resident of State B.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.1 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.2 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.3 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.4 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.5 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.6 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.7 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.8 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.9 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.10 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.11 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.12 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.13 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.14 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.15 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.16 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.17 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.18 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.19 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.20 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.21 (Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.22 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.23 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.24 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.25 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.26 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.27 (Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.28 (Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.29 (Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.30 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.31 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.32 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.33 (Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.34 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.35 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.36 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.37 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.38 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
6.39 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
7. The reference to "income derived by or through an entity or arrangement" has a broad meaning and covers any income that is earned by or through an entity or arrangement, regardless of the view taken by each Contracting State as to who derives that income for domestic tax purposes and regardless of whether or not that entity or arrangement has legal personality or constitutes a person as defined in subparagraph a) of paragraph 1 of Article 3. It would cover, for example, income of any partnership or trust that one or both of the Contracting States treats as wholly or partly fiscally transparent. Also, as illustrated in example 2 of the report, it does not matter where the entity or arrangement is established: the paragraph applies to an entity established in a third State to the extent that, under the domestic tax law of one of the Contracting States, the entity is treated as wholly or partly fiscally transparent and income of that entity is attributed to a resident of that State.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
7.1 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
8. The word "income" must be given the wide meaning that it has for the purposes of the Convention and therefore applies to the various items of income that are covered by Chapter III of the Convention (Taxation of Income), including, for example, profits of an enterprise and capital gains.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
9. The concept of "fiscally transparent" used in the paragraph refers to situations where, under the domestic law of a Contracting State, the income (or part thereof) of the entity or arrangement is not taxed at the level of the entity or the arrangement but at the level of the persons who have an interest in that entity or arrangement. This will normally be the case where the amount of tax payable on a share of the income of an entity or arrangement is determined separately in relation to the personal characteristics of the person who is entitled to that share so that the tax will depend on whether that person is taxable or not, on the other income that the person has, on the personal allowances to which the person is entitled and on the tax rate applicable to that person; also, the character and source, as well as the timing of the realisation, of the income for tax purposes will not be affected by the fact that it has been earned through the entity or arrangement. The fact that the income is computed at the level of the entity or arrangement before the share is allocated to the person will not affect that result.1 States wishing to clarify the definition of "fiscally transparent" in their bilateral conventions are free to include a definition of that term based on the above explanations.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
9.1 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
9.2 (Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
9.3 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
9.4 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
9.5 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
9.6 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
10. In the case of an entity or arrangement which is treated as partly fiscally transparent under the domestic law of one of the Contracting States, only part of the income of the entity or arrangement might be taxed at the level of the persons who have an interest in that entity or arrangement as described in the preceding paragraph whilst the rest would remain taxable at the level of the entity or arrangement. This, for example, is how some trusts and limited liability partnerships are treated in some countries (i.e. in some countries, the part of the income derived through a trust that is distributed to beneficiaries is taxed in the hands of these beneficiaries whilst the part of that income that is accumulated is taxed in the hands of the trust or trustees; similarly, in some countries, income derived through a limited partnership is taxed in the hands of the general partner as regards that partner's share of that income but is considered to be the income of the limited partnership as regards the limited partners' share of the income). To the extent that the entity or arrangement qualifies as a resident of a Contracting State, the paragraph will ensure that the benefits of the treaty also apply to the share of the income that is attributed to the entity or arrangement under the domestic law of that State (subject to any anti-abuse provision such as a limitation-on-benefits rule).
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
10.1 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
10.2 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
11. As with other provisions of the Convention, the provision applies separately to each item of income of the entity or arrangement. Assume, for example, that the document that establishes a trust provides that all dividends received by the trust must be distributed to a beneficiary during the lifetime of that beneficiary but must be accumulated afterwards. If one of the Contracting States considers that, in such a case, the beneficiary is taxable on the dividends distributed to that beneficiary but that the trustees are taxable on the dividends that will be accumulated, the paragraph will apply differently to these two categories of dividends even if both types of dividends are received within the same month.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
12. By providing that the income to which it applies will be considered to be income of a resident of a Contracting State for the purposes of the Convention, the paragraph ensures that the relevant income is attributed to that resident for the purposes of the application of the various allocative rules of the Convention. Depending on the nature of the income, this will therefore allow the income to be considered, for example, as "income derived by" for the purposes of Articles 6, 13 and 17, "profits of an enterprise" for the purposes of Articles 7, 8 and 9 (see also paragraph 4 of the Commentary on Article 3) or dividends or interest "paid to" for the purposes of Articles 10 and 11. The fact that the income is considered to be derived by a resident of a Contracting State for the purposes of the Convention also means that where the income constitutes a share of the income of an enterprise in which that resident holds a participation, such income shall be considered to be the income of an enterprise carried on by that resident (e.g. for the purposes of the definition of enterprise of a Contracting State in Article 3 and paragraph 2 of Article 21).
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
13. Whilst the paragraph ensures that the various allocative rules of the Convention are applied to the extent that income of fiscally transparent entities is treated, under domestic law, as income of a resident of a Contracting State, the paragraph does not prejudge the issue of whether the recipient is the beneficial owner of the relevant income. Where, for example, a fiscally transparent partnership receives dividends as an agent or nominee for a person who is not a partner, the fact that the dividend may be considered as income of a resident of a Contracting State under the domestic law of that State will not preclude the State of source from considering that neither the partnership nor the partners are the beneficial owners of the dividend.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
14. The paragraph only applies for the purposes of the Convention and does not, therefore, require a Contracting State to change the way in which it attributes income or characterises entities for the purposes of its domestic law. In the example in paragraph 6 above, whilst paragraph 2 provides that half of the interest shall be considered, for the purposes of Article 11, to be income of a resident of State B, this will only affect the maximum amount of tax that State A will be able to collect on the interest and will not change the fact that State A's tax will be payable by the entity. Thus, assuming that the domestic law of State A provides for a 30 per cent withholding tax on the interest, the effect of paragraph 2 will simply be to reduce the amount of tax that State A will collect on the interest (so that half of the interest would be taxed at 30 per cent and half at 10 per cent under the treaty between States A and B) and will not change the fact that the entity is the relevant taxpayer for the purposes of State A's domestic law. Also, the provision does not deal exhaustively with all treaty issues that may arise from the legal nature of certain entities and arrangements and may therefore need to be supplemented by other provisions to address such issues (such as a provision confirming that a trust may qualify as a resident of a Contracting State despite the fact that, under the trust law of many countries, a trust does not constitute a "person").
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
15. As confirmed by paragraph 3, paragraph 2 does not restrict in any way a State's right to tax its own residents. This conclusion is consistent with the way in which tax treaties have been interpreted with respect to partnerships (see paragraph 6.1 of this Commentary as it read after 2000 and before the inclusion of paragraph 3 in 2017).
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
16. Paragraphs 2 and 3 do not, however, restrict the Contracting States' obligation to provide relief of double taxation under Articles 23 A and 23 B where income of a resident of that State may be taxed by the other State in accordance with the Convention. There may be cases, however, where the same income is taxed by each Contracting State as income of one of its residents and where relief of double taxation will be necessary with respect to tax paid by a different person. Where, for example, one of the Contracting States taxes the worldwide income of an entity that is a resident of that State whereas the other State views that entity as fiscally transparent and taxes the members of that entity who are residents of that other State on their respective share of the income, relief of double taxation will need to take into account the tax that is paid by different taxpayers in the two States. In such a case, however, it will be important to determine, under Articles 23 A and 23 B, to what extent the income of a resident of one Contracting State "may be taxed in the other Contracting State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention (except to the extent that these provisions allow taxation by that other State solely because the income is also income derived by a resident of that State [...])". In general, this requirement will result in one State having to provide relief of double taxation only to the extent that the provisions of the Convention authorise the other State to tax the relevant income as the State of source or as a State where there is a permanent establishment to which that income is attributable (see paragraphs 11.1 and 11.2 of the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B).
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Paragraph 3
17. Whilst some provisions of the Convention (e.g. Articles 23 A and 23 B) are clearly intended to affect how a Contracting State taxes its own residents, the object of the majority of the provisions of the Convention is to restrict the right of a Contracting State to tax the residents of the other Contracting State. In some limited cases, however, it has been argued that some provisions could be interpreted as limiting a Contracting State's right to tax its own residents in cases where this was not intended (see, for example, paragraph 81 below, which addresses the case of controlled foreign company provisions).
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
18. Paragraph 3 confirms the general principle that the Convention does not restrict a Contracting State's right to tax its own residents except where this is intended and lists the provisions with respect to which that principle is not applicable.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
19. The exceptions so listed are intended to cover all cases where it is envisaged in the Convention that a Contracting State may have to provide treaty benefits to its own residents (whether or not these or similar benefits are provided under the domestic law of that State). These provisions are:
— | Paragraph 3 of Article 7, which requires a Contracting State to grant to an enterprise of that State a correlative adjustment following an initial adjustment made by the other Contracting State, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 7, to the amount of tax charged on the profits of a permanent establishment of the enterprise. | |
— | Paragraph 2 of Article 9, which requires a Contracting State to grant to an enterprise of that State a corresponding adjustment following an initial adjustment made by the other Contracting State, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 9, to the amount of tax charged on the profits of an associated enterprise. | |
— | Article 19, which may affect how a Contracting State taxes an individual who is resident of that State if that individual derives income in respect of services rendered to the other Contracting State or a political subdivision or local authority thereof. | |
— | Article 20, which may affect how a Contracting State taxes an individual who is resident of that State if that individual is also a student who meets the conditions of that Article. | |
— | Articles 23 A and 23 B, which require a Contracting State to provide relief of double taxation to its residents with respect to the income that the other State may tax in accordance with the Convention (including profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment situated in the other Contracting State in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 7). | |
— | Article 24, which protects residents of a Contracting State against certain discriminatory taxation practices by that State (such as rules that discriminate between two persons based on their nationality). | |
— | Article 25, which allows residents of a Contracting State to request that the competent authority of that State consider cases of taxation not in accordance with the Convention. | |
— | Article 28, which may affect how a Contracting State taxes an individual who is resident of that State when that individual is a member of the diplomatic mission or consular post of the other Contracting State. |
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
20. The list of exceptions included in paragraph 3 should include any other provision that the Contracting States may agree to include in their bilateral convention where it is intended that this provision should affect the taxation, by a Contracting State, of its own residents. For instance, if the Contracting States agree, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Commentary on Article 18, to include in their bilateral convention a provision according to which pensions and other payments made under the social security legislation of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State, they should include a reference to that provision in the list of exceptions included in paragraph 3. Other examples include the alternative provisions in paragraphs 23, 30, 37, 38 and 68 of the Commentary on Article 18 because these provisions provide benefits that are typically intended to be granted to an individual who participated in a foreign pension scheme before becoming a resident of a Contracting State.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
21. The term "resident", as used in paragraph 3 and throughout the Convention, is defined in Article 4. Where, under paragraph 1 of Article 4, a person is considered to be a resident of both Contracting States based on the domestic laws of these States, paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article make it generally possible to determine a single State of residence for the purposes of the Convention. Thus, paragraph 3 does not apply to an individual or legal person who is a resident of one of the Contracting States under the laws of that State but who, for the purposes of the Convention, is deemed to be a resident only of the other Contracting State.
(Replaced on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
21.1 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
21.2 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
21.3 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
21.4 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
21.5 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Cross-border issues relating to collective investment vehicles
22. Most countries have dealt with the domestic tax issues arising from groups of small investors who pool their funds in collective investment vehicles (CIVs). In general, the goal of such systems is to provide for neutrality between direct investments and investments through a CIV. Whilst those systems generally succeed when the investors, the CIV and the investment are all located in the same country, complications frequently arise when one or more of those parties or the investments are located in different countries. These complications are discussed in the report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles",1 the main conclusions of which have been incorporated below. For purposes of the Report and for this discussion, the term "CIV" is limited to funds that are widely-held, hold a diversified portfolio of securities and are subject to investor-protection regulation in the country in which they are established.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
22.1 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
22.2 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Application of the Convention to CIVs
23. The primary question that arises in the cross-border context is whether a CIV should qualify for the benefits of the Convention in its own right. In order to do so under treaties that, like the Convention, do not include a specific provision dealing with CIVs, a CIV would have to qualify as a "person" that is a "resident" of a Contracting State and, as regards the application of Articles 10 and 11, that is the "beneficial owner" of the income that it receives.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
24. The determination of whether a CIV should be treated as a "person" begins with the legal form of the CIV, which differs substantially from country to country and between the various types of vehicles. In many countries, most CIVs take the form of a company. In others, the CIV typically would be a trust. In still others, many CIVs are simple contractual arrangements or a form of joint ownership. In most cases, the CIV would be treated as a taxpayer or a "person" for purposes of the tax law of the State in which it is established; for example, in some countries where the CIV is commonly established in the form of a trust, either the trust itself, or the trustees acting collectively in their capacity as such, is treated as a taxpayer or a person for domestic tax law purposes. In view of the wide meaning to be given to the term "person", the fact that the tax law of the country where such a CIV is established would treat it as a taxpayer would be indicative that the CIV is a "person" for treaty purposes. Contracting States wishing to expressly clarify that, in these circumstances, such CIVs are persons for the purposes of their conventions may agree bilaterally to modify the definition of "person" to include them.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
25. Whether a CIV is a "resident" of a Contracting State depends not on its legal form (as long as it qualifies as a person) but on its tax treatment in the State in which it is established. Although a consistent goal of domestic CIV regimes is to ensure that there is only one level of tax, at either the CIV or the investor level, there are a number of different ways in which States achieve that goal. In some States, the holders of interests in the CIV are liable to tax on the income received by the CIV, rather than the CIV itself being liable to tax on such income. Such a fiscally transparent CIV would not be treated as a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established because it is not liable to tax therein.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
26. By contrast, in other States, a CIV is in principle liable to tax but its income may be fully exempt, for instance, if the CIV fulfils certain criteria with regard to its purpose, activities or operation, which may include requirements as to minimum distributions, its sources of income and sometimes its sectors of operation. More frequently, CIVs are subject to tax but the base for taxation is reduced, in a variety of different ways, by reference to distributions paid to investors. Deductions for distributions will usually mean that no tax is in fact paid. Other States tax CIVs but at a special low tax rate. Finally, some States tax CIVs fully but with integration at the investor level to avoid double taxation of the income of the CIV. For those countries that adopt the view, reflected in paragraph 8.11 of the Commentary on Article 4, that a person may be liable to tax even if the State in which it is established does not impose tax, the CIV would be treated as a resident of the State in which it is established in all of these cases because the CIV is subject to comprehensive taxation in that State. Even in the case where the income of the CIV is taxed at a zero rate, or is exempt from tax, the requirements to be treated as a resident may be met if the requirements to qualify for such lower rate or exemption are sufficiently stringent.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
26.1 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
26.2 (Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27. Those countries that adopt the alternative view, reflected in paragraph 8.12 of the Commentary on Article 4, that an entity that is exempt from tax therefore is not liable to tax may not view some or all of the CIVs described in the preceding paragraph as residents of the States in which they are established. States taking the latter view, and those States negotiating with such States, are encouraged to address the issue in their bilateral negotiations.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27.1 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27.2 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27.3 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27.4 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27.5 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27.6 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27.7 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27.8 (Deleted on 22 July 2010; see HISTORY)
27.9 (Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
27.10 (Deleted on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
28. Some countries have questioned whether a CIV, even if it is a "person" and a "resident", can qualify as the beneficial owner of the income it receives. Because a "CIV" as defined in paragraph 22 above must be widely-held, hold a diversified portfolio of securities and be subject to investor-protection regulation in the country in which it is established, such a CIV, or its managers, often perform significant functions with respect to the investment and management of the assets of the CIV. Moreover, the position of an investor in a CIV differs substantially, as a legal and economic matter, from the position of an investor who owns the underlying assets, so that it would not be appropriate to treat the investor in such a CIV as the beneficial owner of the income received by the CIV. Accordingly, a vehicle that meets the definition of a widely-held CIV will also be treated as the beneficial owner of the dividends and interest that it receives, so long as the managers of the CIV have discretionary powers to manage the assets generating such income (unless an individual who is a resident of that State who would have received the income in the same circumstances would not have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof).
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
29. Because these principles are necessarily general, their application to a particular type of CIV might not be clear to the CIV, investors and intermediaries. Any uncertainty regarding treaty eligibility is especially problematic for a CIV, which must take into account amounts expected to be received, including any withholding tax benefits provided by treaty, when it calculates its net asset value ("NAV"). The NAV, which typically is calculated daily, is the basis for the prices used for subscriptions and redemptions. If the withholding tax benefits ultimately obtained by the CIV do not correspond to its original assumptions about the amount and timing of such withholding tax benefits, there will be a discrepancy between the real asset value and the NAV used by investors who have purchased, sold or redeemed their interests in the CIV in the interim.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
30. In order to provide more certainty under existing treaties, tax authorities may want to reach a mutual agreement clarifying the treatment of some types of CIVs in their respective States. With respect to some types of CIVs, such a mutual agreement might simply confirm that the CIV satisfies the technical requirements discussed above and therefore is entitled to benefits in its own right. In other cases, the mutual agreement could provide a CIV an administratively feasible way to make claims with respect to treaty-eligible investors (see paragraphs 36 to 40 of the report "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" for a discussion of this issue). Of course, a mutual agreement could not cut back on benefits that otherwise would be available to the CIV under the terms of a treaty.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Policy issues raised by the current treatment of collective investment vehicles
31. The same considerations would suggest that treaty negotiators address expressly the treatment of CIVs. Thus, even if it appears that CIVs in each of the Contracting States would be entitled to benefits, it may be appropriate to confirm that position publicly (for example, through an exchange of notes) in order to provide certainty. It may also be appropriate to expressly provide for the treaty entitlement of CIVs by including, for example, a provision along the following lines:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a collective investment vehicle which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall be treated, for purposes of applying the Convention to such income, as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof). For purposes of this paragraph, the term "collective investment vehicle" means, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to regard as a collective investment vehicle for purposes of this paragraph.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
32. However, in negotiating new treaties or amendments to existing treaties, the Contracting States would not be restricted to clarifying the results of the application of other treaty provisions to CIVs, but could vary those results to the extent necessary to achieve policy objectives. For example, in the context of a particular bilateral treaty, the technical analysis may result in CIVs located in one of the Contracting States qualifying for benefits, whilst CIVs in the other Contracting State may not. This may make the treaty appear unbalanced, although whether it is so in fact will depend on the specific circumstances. If it is, then the Contracting States should attempt to reach an equitable solution. If the practical result in each of the Contracting States is that most CIVs do not in fact pay tax, then the Contracting States should attempt to overcome differences in legal form that might otherwise cause those in one State to qualify for benefits and those in the other to be denied benefits. On the other hand, the differences in legal form and tax treatment in the two Contracting States may mean that it is appropriate to treat CIVs in the two States differently. In comparing the taxation of CIVs in the two States, taxation in the source State and at the investor level should be considered, not just the taxation of the CIV itself. The goal is to achieve neutrality between a direct investment and an investment through a CIV in the international context, just as the goal of most domestic provisions addressing the treatment of CIVs is to achieve such neutrality in the wholly domestic context.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
33. A Contracting State may also want to consider whether existing treaty provisions are sufficient to prevent CIVs from being used in a potentially abusive manner. It is possible that a CIV could satisfy all of the requirements to claim treaty benefits in its own right, even though its income is not subject to much, if any, tax in practice. In that case, the CIV could present the opportunity for residents of third countries to receive treaty benefits that would not have been available had they invested directly. Accordingly, it may be appropriate to restrict benefits that might otherwise be available to such a CIV, either through generally applicable anti-abuse or anti-treaty-shopping rules (as discussed under "Improper use of the Convention" below) or through a specific provision dealing with CIVs.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
34. In deciding whether such a provision is necessary, Contracting States will want to consider the economic characteristics, including the potential for treaty-shopping, presented by the various types of CIVs that are prevalent in each of the Contracting States. For example, a CIV that is not subject to any taxation in the State in which it is established may present more of a danger of treaty-shopping than one in which the CIV itself is subject to an entity-level tax or where distributions to non-resident investors are subject to withholding tax.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Possible provisions modifying the treatment of CIVs
35. Where the Contracting States have agreed that a specific provision dealing with CIVs is necessary to address the concerns described in paragraphs 32 through 34, they could include in the bilateral treaty the following provision:
(a) | Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a collective investment vehicle which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall be treated for purposes of applying the Convention to such income as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof), but only to the extent that the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle are owned by equivalent beneficiaries. | |
(b) | For purposes of this paragraph: |
(i) | the term "collective investment vehicle" means, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to regard as a collective investment vehicle for purposes of this paragraph; and | |
(ii) | the term "equivalent beneficiary" means a resident of the Contracting State in which the CIV is established, and a resident of any other State with which the Contracting State in which the income arises has an income tax convention that provides for effective and comprehensive information exchange who would, if he received the particular item of income for which benefits are being claimed under this Convention, be entitled under that convention, or under the domestic law of the Contracting State in which the income arises, to a rate of tax with respect to that item of income that is at least as low as the rate claimed under this Convention by the CIV with respect to that item of income. |
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
36. It is intended that the Contracting States would provide in subdivision b)(i) specific cross-references to relevant tax or securities law provisions relating to CIVs. In deciding which treatment should apply with respect to particular CIVs, Contracting States should take into account the policy considerations discussed above. Negotiators may agree that economic differences in the treatment of CIVs in the two Contracting States, or even within the same Contracting State, justify differential treatment in the tax treaty. In that case, some combination of the provisions in this section might be included in the treaty.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
37. The effect of allowing benefits to the CIV to the extent that it is owned by "equivalent beneficiaries" as defined in subdivision b)(ii) is to ensure that investors who would have been entitled to benefits with respect to income derived from the source State had they received the income directly are not put in a worse position by investing through a CIV located in a third country. The approach thus serves the goals of neutrality as between direct investments and investments through a CIV. It also decreases the risk of double taxation as between the source State and the State of residence of the investor, to the extent that there is a tax treaty between them. It is beneficial for investors, particularly those from small countries, who will consequently enjoy a greater choice of investment vehicles. It also increases economies of scale, which are a primary economic benefit of investing through CIVs. Finally, adopting this approach substantially simplifies compliance procedures. In many cases, nearly all of a CIV's investors will be "equivalent beneficiaries", given the extent of bilateral treaty coverage and the fact that rates in those treaties are nearly always 10-15 per cent on portfolio dividends.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
38. At the same time, the provision prevents a CIV from being used by investors to achieve a better tax treaty position than they would have achieved by investing directly. This is achieved through the rate comparison in the definition of "equivalent beneficiary". Accordingly, the appropriate comparison is between the rate claimed by the CIV and the rate that the investor could have claimed had it received the income directly. For example, assume that a CIV established in State B receives dividends from a company resident in State A. Sixty-five per cent of the investors in the CIV are individual residents of State B; ten per cent are pension funds established in State C and 25 per cent are individual residents of State C. Under the A-B tax treaty, portfolio dividends are subject to a maximum tax rate at source of ten per cent. Under the A-C tax treaty, pension funds are exempt from taxation in the source State and other portfolio dividends are subject to tax at a maximum tax rate of 15 per cent. Both the A-B and A-C treaties include effective and comprehensive information exchange provisions. On these facts, 75 per cent of the investors in the CIV — the individual residents of State B and the pension funds established in State C — are equivalent beneficiaries.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
39. A source State may also be concerned about the potential deferral of taxation that could arise with respect to a CIV that is subject to no or low taxation and that may accumulate its income rather than distributing it on a current basis. Such States may be tempted to limit benefits to the CIV to the proportion of the CIV's investors who are currently taxable on their share of the income of the CIV. However, such an approach has proven difficult to apply to widely-held CIVs in practice. Those States that are concerned about the possibility of such deferral may wish to negotiate provisions that extend benefits only to those CIVs that are required to distribute earnings currently. Other States may be less concerned about the potential for deferral, however. They may take the view that, even if the investor is not taxed currently on the income received by the CIV, it will be taxed eventually, either on the distribution, or on any capital gains if it sells its interest in the CIV before the CIV distributes the income. Those States may wish to negotiate provisions that grant benefits to CIVs even if they are not obliged to distribute their income on a current basis. Moreover, in many States, the tax rate with respect to investment income is not significantly higher than the treaty withholding rate on dividends, so there would be little, if any, residence State tax deferral to be achieved by earning such income through an investment fund rather than directly. In addition, many States have taken steps to ensure the current taxation of investment income earned by their residents through investment funds, regardless of whether the funds accumulate that income, further reducing the potential for such deferral. When considering the treatment of CIVs that are not required to distribute income currently, States may want to consider whether these or other factors address the concerns described above so that the type of limits described herein might not in fact be necessary.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
40. Some States believe that taking all treaty-eligible investors, including those in third States, into account would change the bilateral nature of tax treaties. These States may prefer to allow treaty benefits to a CIV only to the extent that the investors in the CIV are residents of the Contracting State in which the CIV is established. In that case, the provision would be drafted as follows:
(a) | Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a collective investment vehicle which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall be treated for purposes of applying the Convention to such income as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof), but only to the extent that the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle are owned by residents of the Contracting State in which the collective investment vehicle is established. | |
(b) | For purposes of this paragraph, the term "collective investment vehicle" means, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to regard as a collective investment vehicle for purposes of this paragraph. |
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
41. Although the purely proportionate approach set out in paragraphs 35 and 40 protects against treaty-shopping, it may also impose substantial administrative burdens as a CIV attempts to determine the treaty entitlement of every single investor. A Contracting State may decide that the fact that a substantial proportion of the CIV's investors are treaty-eligible is adequate protection against treaty-shopping, and thus that it is appropriate to provide an ownership threshold above which benefits would be provided with respect to all income received by the CIV. Including such a threshold would also mitigate some of the procedural burdens that otherwise might arise. If desired, therefore, the following sentence could be added at the end of subparagraph a):
However, if at least [ ] per cent of the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle are owned by [equivalent beneficiaries][residents of the Contracting State in which the collective investment vehicle is established], the collective investment vehicle shall be treated as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of all of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof).
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
42. In some cases, the Contracting States might wish to take a different approach from that put forward in paragraphs 31, 35 and 40 with respect to certain types of CIVs and to treat the CIV as making claims on behalf of the investors rather than in its own name. This might be true, for example, if a large percentage of the owners of interests in the CIV as a whole, or of a class of interests in the CIV, are pension funds that are exempt from tax in the source country under terms of the relevant treaty similar to those described in paragraph 69 of the Commentary on Article 18. To ensure that the investors would not lose the benefit of the preferential rates to which they would have been entitled had they invested directly, the Contracting States might agree to a provision along the following lines with respect to such CIVs (although likely adopting one of the approaches of paragraphs 31, 35 or 40 with respect to other types of CIVs):
(a) | A collective investment vehicle described in subparagraph c) which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall not be treated as a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established, but may claim, on behalf of the owners of the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle, the tax reductions, exemptions or other benefits that would have been available under this Convention to such owners had they received such income directly. | |
(b) | A collective investment vehicle may not make a claim under subparagraph a) for benefits on behalf of any owner of the beneficial interests in such collective investment vehicle if the owner has itself made an individual claim for benefits with respect to income received by the collective investment vehicle. | |
(c) | This paragraph shall apply with respect to, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State to which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to apply this paragraph. |
This provision would, however, limit the CIV to making claims on behalf of residents of the same Contracting State in which the CIV is established. If, for the reasons described in paragraph 37, the Contracting States deemed it desirable to allow the CIV to make claims on behalf of treaty-eligible residents of third States, that could be accomplished by replacing the words "this Convention" with "any Convention to which the other Contracting State is a party" in subparagraph a). If, as anticipated, the Contracting States would agree that the treatment provided in this paragraph would apply only to specific types of CIVs, it would be necessary to ensure that the types of CIVs listed in subparagraph c) did not include any of the types of CIVs listed in a more general provision such as that in paragraphs 31, 35 or 40 so that the treatment of a specific type of CIV would be fixed, rather than elective. Countries wishing to allow individual CIVs to elect their treatment, either with respect to the CIV as a whole or with respect to one or more classes of interests in the CIV, are free to modify the paragraph to do so.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
43. Under either the approach in paragraphs 35 and 40 or in paragraph 42, it will be necessary for the CIV to make a determination regarding the proportion of holders of interests who would have been entitled to benefits had they invested directly. Because ownership of interests in CIVs changes regularly, and such interests frequently are held through intermediaries, the CIV and its managers often do not themselves know the names and treaty status of the beneficial owners of interests. It would be impractical for the CIV to collect such information from the relevant intermediaries on a daily basis. Accordingly, Contracting States should be willing to accept practical and reliable approaches that do not require such daily tracing.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
44. For example, in many countries the CIV industry is largely domestic, with an overwhelming percentage of investors resident in the country in which the CIV is established. In some cases, tax rules discourage foreign investment by imposing a withholding tax on distributions, or securities laws may severely restrict offerings to non-residents. Governments should consider whether these or other circumstances provide adequate protection against investment by non-treaty-eligible residents of third countries. It may be appropriate, for example, to assume that a CIV is owned by residents of the State in which it is established if the CIV has limited distribution of its shares or units to the State in which the CIV is established or to other States that provide for similar benefits in their treaties with the source State.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
45. In other cases, interests in the CIV are offered to investors in many countries. Although the identity of individual investors will change daily, the proportion of investors in the CIV that are treaty-entitled is likely to change relatively slowly. Accordingly, it would be a reasonable approach to require the CIV to collect from other intermediaries, on specified dates, information enabling the CIV to determine the proportion of investors that are treaty- entitled. This information could be required at the end of a calendar or fiscal year or, if market conditions suggest that turnover in ownership is high, it could be required more frequently, although no more often than the end of each calendar quarter. The CIV could then make a claim on the basis of an average of those amounts over an agreed-upon time period. In adopting such procedures, care would have to be taken in choosing the measurement dates to ensure that the CIV would have enough time to update the information that it provides to other payers so that the correct amount is withheld at the beginning of each relevant period.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
46. An alternative approach would provide that a CIV that is publicly traded in the Contracting State in which it is established will be entitled to treaty benefits without regard to the residence of its investors. This provision has been justified on the basis that a publicly-traded CIV cannot be used effectively for treaty-shopping because the shareholders or unitholders of such a CIV cannot individually exercise control over it. Such a provision could read:
(a) | Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a collective investment vehicle which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall be treated for purposes of applying the Convention to such income as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof), if the principal class of shares or units in the collective investment vehicle is listed and regularly traded on a regulated stock exchange in that State. | |
(b) | For purposes of this paragraph, the term "collective investment vehicle" means, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to regard as a collective investment vehicle for purposes of this paragraph. |
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
47. Each of the provisions in paragraphs 31, 35, 40 and 46 treats the CIV as the resident and the beneficial owner of the income it receives for the purposes of the application of the Convention to such income, which has the simplicity of providing for one reduced rate of withholding with respect to each type of income. As confirmed by paragraph 3 of the Article, these provisions, however, do not restrict in any way the right of the State of source from taxing its own residents who are investors in the CIV. Clearly, these provisions are intended to deal with the source taxation of the CIV's income and not the residence taxation of its investors.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
48. Also, each of these provisions is intended only to provide that the specific characteristics of the CIV will not cause it to be treated as other than the beneficial owner of the income it receives. Therefore, a CIV will be treated as the beneficial owner of all of the income it receives. The provision is not intended, however, to put a CIV in a different or better position than other investors with respect to aspects of the beneficial ownership requirement that are unrelated to the CIV's status as such. Accordingly, where an individual receiving an item of income in certain circumstances would not be considered as the beneficial owner of that income, a CIV receiving that income in the same circumstances could not be deemed to be the beneficial owner of the income. This result is confirmed by the parenthetical limiting the application of the provision to situations in which an individual in the same circumstances would have been treated as the beneficial owner of the income.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Application of the Convention to States, their subdivisions and their wholly-owned entities
49. Paragraph 1 of Article 4 provides that the Contracting States themselves, their political subdivisions and their local authorities are included in the definition of a "resident of a Contracting State" and are therefore entitled to the benefits of the Convention (paragraph 8.4 of the Commentary on Article 4 explains that the inclusion of these words in 1995 confirmed the prior general understanding of most member States).
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
50. Issues may arise, however, in the case of entities set up and wholly- owned by a State or one of its political subdivisions or local authorities. Some of these entities may derive substantial income from other countries and it may therefore be important to determine whether tax treaties apply to them (this would be the case, for instance, of sovereign wealth funds: see paragraph 8.5 of the Commentary on Article 4). In many cases, these entities are totally exempt from tax and the question may arise as to whether they are entitled to the benefits of the tax treaties concluded by the State in which they are set up. In order to clarify the issue, some States modify the definition of "resident of a Contracting State" in paragraph 1 of Article 4 and include in that definition a "statutory body", an "agency or instrumentality" or a "legal person of public law" [personne morale de droit public] of a State, a political subdivision or local authority, which would therefore cover wholly-owned entities that are not considered to be a part of the State or its political subdivisions or local authorities.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
51. In addition, many States include specific provisions in their bilateral conventions that grant an exemption to other States, and to some State- owned entities such as central banks, with respect to certain items of income such as interest (see paragraph 13.2 of the Commentary on Article 10 and paragraph 7.4 of the Commentary on Article 11). Treaty provisions that grant a tax exemption with respect to the income of pension funds (see paragraph 69 of the Commentary on Article 18) may similarly apply to pension funds that are wholly-owned by a State, depending on the wording of these provisions and the nature of the fund.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
52. The application of the Convention to each Contracting State, its political subdivisions, and local authorities (and their statutory bodies, agencies or instrumentalities in the case of bilateral treaties that apply to such entities) should not be interpreted, however, as affecting in any way the possible application by each State of the customary international law principle of sovereign immunity. According to this principle, a sovereign State (including its agents, its property and activities) is, as a general rule, immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another sovereign State. There is no international consensus, however, on the precise limits of the sovereign immunity principle. Most States, for example, would not recognise that the principle applies to business activities and many States do not recognise any application of this principle in tax matters. There are therefore considerable differences between States as regards the extent, if any, to which that principle applies to taxation. Even among States that would recognise its possible application in tax matters, some apply it only to the extent that it has been incorporated into domestic law and others apply it as customary international law but subject to important limitations. The Convention does not prejudge the issues of whether and to what extent the principle of sovereign immunity applies with respect to the persons covered under Article 1 and the taxes covered under Article 2 and each Contracting State is therefore free to apply its own interpretation of that principle as long as the resulting taxation, if any, is in conformity with the provisions of its bilateral tax conventions.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
53. States often take account of various factors when considering whether and to what extent tax exemptions should be granted, through specific treaty or domestic law provisions or through the application of the sovereign immunity doctrine, with respect to the income derived by other States, their political subdivisions, local authorities, or their statutory bodies, agencies or instrumentalities. These factors would include, for example, whether that type of income would be exempt on a reciprocal basis, whether the income is derived from activities of a governmental nature as opposed to activities of a commercial nature, whether the assets and income of the recipient entity are used for public purposes, whether there is any possibility that these could inure to the benefit of a non-governmental person and whether the income is derived from a portfolio or direct investment.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Improper use of the Convention
54. The principal purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international double taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons. As confirmed in the preamble of the Convention, it is also a part of the purposes of tax conventions to prevent tax avoidance and evasion.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
55. The extension of the network of tax conventions increases the risk of abuse by facilitating the use of arrangements aimed at securing the benefits of both the tax advantages available under certain domestic laws and the reliefs from tax provided for in these conventions.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
56. This would be the case, for example, if a person (whether or not a resident of a Contracting State), acts through a legal entity created in a State essentially to obtain treaty benefits that would not be available directly. Another case would be an individual who has in a Contracting State both his permanent home and all his economic interests, including a substantial shareholding in a company of that State, and who, essentially in order to sell the shares and escape taxation in that State on the capital gains from the alienation (by virtue of paragraph 5 of Article 13), transfers his permanent home to the other Contracting State, where such gains are subject to little or no tax.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Addressing tax avoidance through tax conventions
57. Paragraph 9 of Article 29 and the specific treaty anti-abuse rules included in tax conventions are aimed at these and other transactions and arrangements entered into for the purpose of obtaining treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances. Where, however, a tax convention does not include such rules, the question may arise whether the benefits of the tax convention should be granted when transactions that constitute an abuse of the provisions of that convention are entered into.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
58. Many States address that question by taking account of the fact that taxes are ultimately imposed through the provisions of domestic law, as restricted (and in some rare cases, broadened) by the provisions of tax conventions. Thus, any abuse of the provisions of a tax convention could also be characterised as an abuse of the provisions of domestic law under which tax will be levied. For these States, the issue then becomes whether the provisions of tax conventions may prevent the application of the anti-abuse provisions of domestic law, which is the question addressed in paragraphs 66 to 80 below. As explained in these paragraphs, as a general rule, there will be no conflict between such rules and the provisions of tax conventions.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
59. Other States prefer to view some abuses as being abuses of the convention itself, as opposed to abuses of domestic law. These States, however, then consider that a proper construction of tax conventions allows them to disregard abusive transactions, such as those entered into with the view to obtaining unintended benefits under the provisions of these conventions. This interpretation results from the object and purpose of tax conventions as well as the obligation to interpret them in good faith (see Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
60. Under both approaches, therefore, it is agreed that States do not have to grant the benefits of a double taxation convention where arrangements that constitute an abuse of the provisions of the convention have been entered into.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
61. It is important to note, however, that it should not be lightly assumed that a taxpayer is entering into the type of abusive transactions referred to above. A guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation convention should not be available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements was to secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions. That principle applies independently from the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 29, which merely confirm it.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
62. The potential application of these principles or of paragraph 9 of Article 29 does not mean that there is no need for the inclusion, in tax conventions, of specific provisions aimed at preventing particular forms of tax avoidance. Where specific avoidance techniques have been identified or where the use of such techniques is especially problematic, it will often be useful to add to the Convention provisions that focus directly on the relevant avoidance strategy. Also, this will be necessary where a State which adopts the view described in paragraph 58 above believes that its domestic law lacks the anti-avoidance rules or principles necessary to properly address such strategy.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
63. For instance, some forms of tax avoidance have already been expressly dealt with in the Convention, e.g. by the introduction of the concept of "beneficial owner" (in Articles 10, 11, and 12) and of special provisions such as paragraph 2 of Article 17 dealing with so-called artiste-companies. Such problems are also mentioned in the Commentaries on Article 10 (paragraphs 17 and 22), Article 11 (paragraph 12) and Article 12 (paragraph 7).
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
64. Also, in some cases, claims to treaty benefits by subsidiary companies, in particular companies established in tax havens or benefiting from harmful preferential regimes, may be refused where careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of a case shows that the place of effective management of a subsidiary does not lie in its alleged state of residence but, rather, lies in the state of residence of the parent company so as to make it a resident of that latter state for domestic law and treaty purposes (this will be relevant where the domestic law of a state uses the place of management of a legal person, or a similar criterion, to determine its residence).
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
65. Careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of a case may also show that a subsidiary was managed in the state of residence of its parent in such a way that the subsidiary had a permanent establishment (e.g. by having a place of management) in that state to which all or a substantial part of its profits were properly attributable.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Addressing tax avoidance through domestic anti-abuse rules and judicial doctrines
66. Domestic anti-abuse rules and judicial doctrines may also be used to address transactions and arrangements entered into for the purpose of obtaining treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances. These rules and doctrines may also address situations where transactions or arrangements are entered into for the purpose of abusing both domestic laws and tax conventions.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
67. For these reasons, domestic anti-abuse rules and judicial doctrines play an important role in preventing treaty benefits from being granted in inappropriate circumstances. The application of such domestic anti-abuse rules and doctrines, however, raises the issue of possible conflicts with treaty provisions, in particular where treaty provisions are relied upon in order to facilitate the abuse of domestic law provisions (e.g. where it is claimed that treaty provisions protect the taxpayer from the application of certain domestic anti-abuse rules). This issue is discussed below in relation to specific legislative anti-abuse rules, general legislative anti-abuse rules and judicial doctrines.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Specific legislative anti-abuse rules
68. Tax authorities seeking to address the improper use of a tax treaty may first consider the application of specific anti-abuse rules included in their domestic tax law.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
69. Many specific anti-abuse rules found in domestic law apply primarily in cross-border situations and may be relevant for the application of tax treaties. For instance, thin capitalisation rules may apply to restrict the deduction of base-eroding interest payments to residents of treaty countries; transfer pricing rules (even if not designed primarily as anti-abuse rules) may prevent the artificial shifting of income from a resident enterprise to an enterprise that is resident of a treaty country; exit or departure tax rules may prevent the avoidance of capital gains tax through a change of residence before the realisation of a treaty-exempt capital gain; dividend stripping rules may prevent the avoidance of domestic dividend withholding taxes through transactions designed to transform dividends into treaty-exempt capital gains; and anti-conduit rules may prevent certain avoidance transactions involving the use of conduit arrangements.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
70. Generally, where the application of provisions of domestic law and of those of tax treaties produces conflicting results, the provisions of tax treaties are intended to prevail. This is a logical consequence of the principle of "pacta sunt servanda" which is incorporated in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Thus, if the application of specific anti-abuse rules found in domestic law were to result in a tax treatment that is not in accordance with the provisions of a tax treaty, this would conflict with the provisions of that treaty and the provisions of the treaty should prevail under public international law.1
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
71. As explained below, however, such conflicts will often be avoided and each case must be analysed based on its own circumstances.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
72. First, a treaty may specifically allow the application of certain types of specific domestic anti-abuse rules. For example, Article 9 specifically authorises the application of domestic rules in the circumstances defined by that Article. Also, many treaties include specific provisions clarifying that there is no conflict or, even if there is a conflict, allowing the application of the domestic rules. This would be the case, for example, for a treaty rule that expressly allows the application of a thin capitalisation rule found in the domestic law of one or both Contracting States.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
73. Second, many provisions of the Convention depend on the application of domestic law. This is the case, for instance, for the determination of the residence of a person (see paragraph 1 of Article 4), the determination of what is immovable property (see paragraph 2 of Article 6) and the determination of when income from corporate rights might be treated as a dividend (see paragraph 3 of Article 10). More generally, paragraph 2 of Article 3 makes domestic rules relevant for the purposes of determining the meaning of terms that are not defined in the Convention. In many cases, therefore, the application of specific anti-abuse rules found in domestic law will have an impact on how the treaty provisions are applied rather than produce conflicting results. This would be the case, for example, if a domestic law provision treats the profits realised by a shareholder when a company redeems some of its shares as dividends: although such a redemption could be considered to constitute an alienation for the purposes of paragraph 5 of Article 13, paragraph 28 of the Commentary on Article 10 recognises that such profits will constitute dividends for the purposes of Article 10 if the profits are treated as dividends under domestic law.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
74. Third, the application of tax treaty provisions in a case that involves an abuse of these provisions may be denied under paragraph 9 of Article 29 or, in the case of a treaty that does not include that paragraph, under the principles put forward in paragraphs 60 and 61 above. In such a case, there will be no conflict with the treaty provisions if the benefits of the treaty are denied under both paragraph 9 of Article 29 (or the principles in paragraphs 60 and 61 above) and the relevant domestic specific anti-abuse rules. Domestic specific anti- abuse rules, however, are often drafted with reference to objective facts, such as the existence of a certain level of shareholding or a certain debt-equity ratio. Whilst this facilitates their application and provides greater certainty, it may sometimes result in the application of such a rule in a case where the rule conflicts with a provision of the Convention and where paragraph 9 of Article 29 does not apply to deny the benefits of that provision (and where the principles of paragraphs 60 and 61 above also do not apply). In such a case, the Convention will not allow the application of the domestic rule to the extent of the conflict. An example of such a case would be where a domestic law rule that State A adopted to prevent temporary changes of residence for tax purposes would provide for the taxation of an individual who is a resident of State B on gains from the alienation of property situated in a third State if that individual was a resident of State A when the property was acquired and was a resident of State A for at least seven of the 10 years preceding the alienation. In such a case, to the extent that paragraph 5 of Article 13 would prevent the taxation of that individual by State A upon the alienation of the property, the Convention would prevent the application of that domestic rule unless the benefits of paragraph 5 of Article 13 could be denied, in that specific case, under paragraph 9 of Article 29 or the principles in paragraphs 60 and 61 above.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
75. Fourth, the application of tax treaty provisions may be denied under judicial doctrines or principles applicable to the interpretation of the treaty (see paragraph 78 below). In such a case, there will be no conflict with the treaty provisions if the benefits of the treaty are denied under both a proper interpretation of the treaty and as result of the application of domestic specific anti-abuse rules. Assume, for example, that the domestic law of State A provides for the taxation of gains derived from the alienation of shares of a domestic company in which the alienator holds more than 25 per cent of the capital if that alienator was a resident of State A for at least seven of the 10 years preceding the alienation. In year 2, an individual who was a resident of State A for the previous 10 years becomes a resident of State B. Shortly after becoming a resident of State B, the individual sells the totality of the shares of a small company that he previously established in State A. The facts reveal, however, that all the elements of the sale were finalised in year 1, that an interest-free "loan" corresponding to the sale price was made by the purchaser to the seller at that time, that the purchaser cancelled the loan when the shares were sold to the purchaser in year 2 and that the purchaser exercised de facto control of the company from year 1. Although the gain from the sale of the shares might otherwise fall under paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the State A-State B treaty, the circumstances of the transfer of the shares are such that the alienation in year 2 constitutes a sham within the meaning given to that term by the courts of State A. In that case, to the extent that the sham transaction doctrine developed by the courts of State A does not conflict with the rules of interpretation of treaties, it will be possible to apply that doctrine when interpreting paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the State A-State B treaty, which will allow State A to tax the relevant gain under its domestic law rule.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
General legislative anti-abuse rule
76. Many countries have included in their domestic law a legislative anti- abuse rule of general application intended to prevent abusive arrangements that are not adequately dealt with through specific anti-abuse rules or judicial doctrines.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
77. The application of such general anti-abuse rules also raises the question of a possible conflict with the provisions of a tax treaty. In the vast majority of cases, however, no such conflict will arise. Conflicts will first be avoided for reasons similar to those presented in paragraphs 72 and 73 above. In addition, where the main aspects of these domestic general anti-abuse rules are in conformity with the principle of paragraph 61 above and are therefore similar to the main aspects of paragraph 9 of Article 29, which incorporates this guiding principle, it is clear that no conflict will be possible since the relevant domestic general anti-abuse rule will apply in the same circumstances in which the benefits of the Convention would be denied under paragraph 9 of Article 29, or, in the case of a treaty that does not include that paragraph, under the guiding principle in paragraph 61 above.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Judicial doctrines that are part of domestic law
78. In the process of interpreting tax legislation in cases dealing with tax avoidance, the courts of many countries have developed a number of judicial doctrines or principles of interpretation. These include doctrines such as substance over form, economic substance, sham, business purpose, step- transaction, abuse of law and fraus legis. These doctrines and principles of interpretation, which vary from country to country and evolve over time based on refinements or changes resulting from subsequent court decisions, are essentially views expressed by courts as to how tax legislation should be interpreted. Whilst the interpretation of tax treaties is governed by general rules that have been codified in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, these general rules do not prevent the application of similar judicial doctrines and principles to the interpretation of the provisions of tax treaties. If, for example, the courts of one country have determined that, as a matter of legal interpretation, domestic tax provisions should apply on the basis of the economic substance of certain transactions, there is nothing that prevents a similar approach from being adopted with respect to the application of the provisions of a tax treaty to similar transactions. This is illustrated by the example in paragraph 75 above.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
79. As a general rule and having regard to paragraph 61, therefore, the preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that there will be no conflict between tax conventions and judicial anti-abuse doctrines or general domestic anti-abuse rules. For example, to the extent that the application of a general domestic anti-abuse rule or a judicial doctrine such as "substance over form" or "economic substance" results in a recharacterisation of income or in a redetermination of the taxpayer who is considered to derive such income, the provisions of the Convention will be applied taking into account these changes.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
80. Whilst these rules do not conflict with tax conventions, there is agreement that member countries should carefully observe the specific obligations enshrined in tax treaties to relieve double taxation as long as there is no clear evidence that the treaties are being abused.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Controlled foreign company provisions
81. A significant number of countries have adopted controlled foreign company provisions to address issues related to the use of foreign base companies. Whilst the design of this type of legislation varies considerably among countries, a common feature of these rules, which are now internationally recognised as a legitimate instrument to protect the domestic tax base, is that they result in a Contracting State taxing its residents on income attributable to their participation in certain foreign entities. It has sometimes been argued, based on a certain interpretation of provisions of the Convention such as paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10, that this common feature of controlled foreign company legislation conflicted with these provisions. Since such legislation results in a State taxing its own residents, paragraph 3 of Article 1 confirms that it does not conflict with tax conventions. The same conclusion must be reached in the case of conventions that do not include a provision similar to paragraph 3 of Article 1; for the reasons explained in paragraphs 14 of the Commentary on Article 7 and 37 of the Commentary on Article 10, the interpretation according to which these Articles would prevent the application of controlled foreign company provisions does not accord with the text of paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10. It also does not hold when these provisions are read in their context. Thus, whilst some countries have felt it useful to expressly clarify, in their conventions, that controlled foreign company legislation did not conflict with the Convention, such clarification is not necessary. It is recognised that controlled foreign company legislation structured in this way is not contrary to the provisions of the Convention.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Restricting treaty benefits with respect to income that is subject to certain features of another State's tax system
82. As indicated in paragraph 15.2 of the Introduction
… it is assumed that where a State accepts treaty provisions that restrict its right to tax elements of income, it generally does so on the understanding that these elements of income are taxable in the other State. Where a State levies no or low income taxes, other States should consider whether there are risks of double taxation that would justify, by themselves, a tax treaty. States should also consider whether there are elements of another State's tax system that could increase the risk of non-taxation, which may include tax advantages that are ring-fenced from the domestic economy.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
83. A State may conclude that certain features of the tax system of another State are not sufficient to prevent the conclusion of a tax treaty but may want to prevent the application of that treaty to income that is subject to no or low tax because of these features. Where the relevant features of the tax system of the other State are known at the time the treaty is being negotiated, it is possible to draft provisions that specifically deny treaty benefits with respect to income that benefits from these features (see, for example, paragraph 108 below).
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
84. Such features might, however, be introduced in the tax system of a treaty partner only after the conclusion of a tax treaty or might be discovered only after the treaty has entered into force. When concluding a tax treaty, a Contracting State may therefore be concerned about features of the tax system of a treaty partner of which it is not aware at that time or that may subsequently become part of the tax system of that treaty partner. Controlled foreign company provisions (see paragraph 81 above) and other approaches discussed in the above section on "Improper use of the Convention" may assist in dealing with some of these features but since the difficulties created by these features arise from the design of the tax laws of treaty partners rather than from tax avoidance strategies designed by taxpayers or their advisers, Contracting States may wish to address these difficulties though specific treaty provisions. The following include examples of provisions that might be adopted for that purpose.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Provision on special tax regimes
85. Provisions could be included in a tax treaty in order to deny the application of specific treaty provisions with respect to income benefiting from regimes that satisfy the criteria of a general definition of "special tax regimes". For instance, the benefits of the provisions of Articles 11 and 12 could be denied with respect to interest and royalties that would be derived from a connected person if such interest and royalties benefited, in the State of residence of their beneficial owner, from such a special tax regime; this would be done by adding to Articles 11 and 12 a provision drafted along the following lines (which could be amended to fit the circumstances of the Contracting States or for inclusion in other Articles of the Convention):
Notwithstanding the provisions of [(in the case of Article 11): paragraphs 1 and 2 but subject to the provisions of paragraph 4] [(in the case of Article 12): paragraph 1 but subject to the provisions of paragraph 3] of this Article, [interest] [royalties] arising in a Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State that is connected to the payer may be taxed in the first-mentioned Contracting State in accordance with domestic law if such resident benefits from a special tax regime with respect to the [interest] [royalties] in the State of which it is resident.
For the purposes of the above provision, the reference to a resident that is "connected" to the payer should be interpreted in accordance with the definition of "connected person" which is found in the Commentary on paragraph 7 of Article 29. As indicated in paragraph 127 of that Commentary, if the above provision is included in the Convention, it would seem appropriate to include that definition in paragraph 1 of Article 3, which includes the definitions that apply throughout the Convention. Some States, however, may prefer to replace the reference to a resident that is "connected" to the payer by a reference to a resident that is "closely related" to the payer, the main difference being that, unlike the definition of "connected" person, the definition of "closely related" person found in paragraph 8 of Article 5 does not apply where a person possesses directly or indirectly exactly 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of another person (if the definition of "closely related" person is used for the purposes of the above provision, that definition would be more appropriately included in paragraph 1 of Article 3).
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
86. Also, the above provision would require a definition of "special tax regime", which could be drafted as follows and added to the list of general definitions included in paragraph 1 of Article 3:
the term "special tax regime" means any statute, regulation or administrative practice in a Contracting State with respect to a tax described in Article 2 that meets all of the following conditions:
(i) | results in one or more of the following: |
(A) | a preferential rate of taxation for interest, royalties or any combination thereof as compared to income from sales of goods or services; | |
(B) | a permanent reduction in the tax base with respect to interest, royalties or any combination thereof without a comparable reduction for income from sales of goods or services, by allowing: |
(1) | an exclusion from gross receipts; | |
(2) | a deduction without regard to any corresponding payment or obligation to make a payment; | |
(3) | a deduction for dividends paid or accrued; or; | |
(4) | taxation that is inconsistent with the principles of Article 7 or 9; or |
(C) | a preferential rate of taxation or a permanent reduction in the tax base of the type described in sub-clauses 1), 2), 3) or 4) of clause B) of this subdivision with respect to substantially all of a company's income or substantially all of a company's foreign source income, for companies that do not engage in the active conduct of a business in that Contracting State; |
(ii) | in the case of any preferential rate of taxation or permanent reduction in the tax base for royalties, does not condition such benefits on |
(A) | the extent of research and development activities that take place in the Contracting State; or | |
(B) | expenditures (excluding any expenditures which relate to subcontracting to a related party or any acquisition costs), which the person enjoying the benefits incurs for the purpose of actual research and development activities; |
(iii) | is generally expected to result in a rate of taxation that is less than the lesser of either: |
(A) | [rate to be determined bilaterally]; or | |
(B) | 60 per cent of the general statutory rate of company tax applicable in the other Contracting State; |
(iv) | does not apply principally to: |
(A) | recognised pension funds; | |
(B) | organisations that are established and maintained exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, artistic, cultural or educational purposes; | |
(C) | persons the taxation of which achieves a single level of taxation either in the hands of the person or the person's shareholders (with at most one year of deferral), that hold a diversified portfolio of securities, that are subject to investor-protection regulation in the Contracting State and the interests in which are marketed primarily to retail investors; or | |
(D) | persons the taxation of which achieves a single level of taxation either in the hands of the person or the person's shareholders (with at most one year of deferral) and that hold predominantly immovable property; and |
(v) | after consultation with the first-mentioned Contracting State, has been identified by the other Contracting State through diplomatic channels to the first-mentioned Contracting State as satisfying subdivisions (i) through (iv) of this subparagraph. |
No statute, regulation or administrative practice shall be treated as a special tax regime until 30 days after the date when the other Contracting State issues a written public notification identifying the regime as satisfying subdivisions (i) through (iv) of this subparagraph.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
87. The above definition of the term "special tax regime" applies to any legislation, regulation or administrative practice (including a ruling practice) that exists before or comes into effect after the treaty is signed and that meets all of the following five conditions.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
88. Under the first condition, described in subdivision (i) of the definition, the regime must result in one or more of the following:
A. | a preferential rate of taxation for interest, royalties or any combination thereof as compared to income from sales of goods or services; | |
B. | certain permanent reductions in the tax base with respect to interest, royalties or any combination thereof without a comparable reduction for sales or services income; or | |
C. | a preferential rate of taxation or certain permanent reductions in the tax base with respect to substantially all income or substantially all foreign source income for companies that do not engage in the active conduct of a business in that Contracting State. This part of the definition is intended to identify regimes that, in general, tax mobile income more favourably than non-mobile income. |
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
89. As provided in clause A), subdivision (i) shall be met if a regime provides a preferential rate of taxation for interest, royalties or a combination of the two as compared to sales or services income. For example, a regime that provides a preferential rate of taxation on royalty income earned by resident companies, but does not provide such preferential rate to income from sales or services, would meet this condition. Furthermore, a regime that provides a preferential rate of taxation for all classes of income, but such preferential rate is in effect available primarily for interest, royalties or a combination of the two, would satisfy subdivision (i) despite the fact that the beneficial treatment is not explicitly limited to those classes of income. For example, a tax authority's administrative practice of issuing routine rulings that provide a preferential rate of taxation for companies that represent that they earn primarily interest income (such as group financing companies) would satisfy subdivision (i) even if such rulings as a technical matter provide that preferential rate to all forms of income.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
90. Similarly, as provided in clause B), subdivision (i) shall be met if a regime provides for a permanent reduction in the tax base with respect to interest, royalties or a combination thereof as compared to income from sales of goods or services, in one or more of the following ways: an exclusion from gross receipts (such as an automatic fixed reduction in the amount of royalties included in income, whereas such reduction is not also available for income from the sale of goods or services); a deduction without any corresponding payment or obligation to make a payment; a deduction for dividends paid or accrued; or taxation that is inconsistent with the principles of Articles 7 or 9 of the Convention. An example of a tax regime that results in taxation that is inconsistent with the principles of Article 9 is that of a regime under which no interest income would be imputed on an interest-free note that is held by a company resident of a Contracting State and is issued by an associated enterprise that is a resident of the other Contracting State.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
91. A permanent reduction in a State's tax base does not arise merely from timing differences. For example, the fact that a particular country does not tax interest until it is actually paid, rather than when it economically accrues, is not regarded as a regime that provides a permanent reduction in the tax base, because such a rule represents an ordinary timing difference. However, a regime that results in excessive deferral over a period of many years shall be regarded as providing for a permanent reduction in the tax base, because such a rule in substance constitutes a permanent difference in the base of the taxing country.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
92. Alternatively, as provided in clause C), subdivision (i) shall be satisfied if a regime provides a preferential rate of taxation or a permanent reduction in the tax base (of the type described above), with respect to substantially all income or substantially all foreign source income, for companies that do not engage in the active conduct of a business in the Contracting State. For example, regimes that provide preferential rates of taxation only to income of group financing companies or holding companies would generally satisfy subdivision (i).
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
93. A regime that provides for beneficial tax treatment that is generally applicable to all income (in particular to income from sales and services) and across all industries should not meet subdivision (i). Examples of generally applicable provisions that would not meet subdivision (i) include regimes permitting standard deductions, accelerated depreciation, corporate tax consolidation, dividends received deductions, loss carryovers and foreign tax credits.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
94. The second condition, described in subdivision (ii) of the definition, applies only with respect to royalties and is met if a regime does not condition benefits either on the extent of research and development activities that take place in the Contracting State or on expenditures (excluding any expenditures which relate to subcontracting to a related party or any acquisition costs), which the person enjoying the benefits incurs for the purpose of actual research and development activities. Subdivision (ii) is intended to ensure that royalties benefiting from patent box or innovation box regimes are eligible for treaty benefits only if such regimes satisfy one of these two requirements. Some States, however, would prefer that the requirements of subdivision (ii) be restricted so as to only be met if a regime conditions benefits on the extent of research and development activities that take place in the Contracting State. States that share that view may prefer to use the following alternative version of subdivision (ii):
(ii) | in the case of any preferential rate of taxation or permanent reduction in the tax base for royalties, does not condition such benefits on the extent of research and development activities that take place in the Contracting State; |
Under either version of subdivision (ii), royalty regimes that have been considered by the OECD's Forum on Harmful Tax Practices and were not determined to be "actually harmful" generally would not meet subdivision (ii) and, if so, would not be treated as special tax regimes.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
95. The third condition, described in subdivision (iii) of the definition, requires that a regime be generally expected to result in a rate of taxation that is less than the lesser of a rate that would be agreed bilaterally between the Contracting States and 60 per cent of the general statutory rate of company tax applicable in the Contracting State that considers the regime of the other State as a potential "special tax regime".
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
96. States may consider it useful to clarify the reference to "rate of taxation" for the purposes of subdivision (iii) by including the following in an instrument reflecting the agreed interpretation of the treaty:
Except as provided below, the rate of taxation shall be determined based on the income tax principles of the Contracting State that has implemented the regime in question. Therefore, in the case of a regime that provides only for a preferential rate of taxation, the generally expected rate of taxation under the regime shall equal such preferential rate. In the case of a regime that provides only for a permanent reduction in the tax base, the rate of taxation shall equal the statutory rate of company tax generally applicable in the Contracting State to companies subject to the regime in question less the product of such rate and the percentage reduction in the tax base (with the baseline tax base determined under the principles of the Contracting State, but without regard to any permanent reductions in the tax base described in clause B) of subdivision (i)) that the regime is generally expected to provide. For example, a regime that generally provides for a 20 per cent permanent reduction in a company's tax base would have a rate of taxation equal to the applicable statutory rate of company tax reduced by 20 per cent of such statutory rate. In the case of a regime that provides for both a preferential rate of taxation and a permanent reduction in the tax base, the rate of taxation would be based on the preferential rate of taxation reduced by the product of such rate and the percentage reduction in the tax base.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
97. The preceding would clarify that the rate of taxation should be determined based on the income tax principles of the Contracting State that has implemented the regime in question. Therefore, in the case of a regime that provides only for a preferential rate of taxation, the generally expected rate of taxation under the regime will equal such preferential rate. In the case of a regime that provides only for a permanent reduction in the tax base, the rate of taxation will equal the statutory rate of company tax in the Contracting State that is generally applicable to companies subject to the regime in question less the product of such rate and the percentage reduction in the tax base (with the baseline tax base determined under the principles of the Contracting State, but without regard to any permanent reductions in the tax base described in clause B) of subdivision (i) of the definition) that the regime is generally expected to provide. For example, a regime that generally provides for a 20 per cent permanent reduction in a company's tax base would have a rate of taxation equal to the applicable statutory rate of company tax reduced by 20 per cent of such statutory rate. Therefore, if the applicable statutory rate of company tax in force in a Contracting State were 25 per cent, the rate of taxation resulting from such a regime would be 20 per cent (25 – (25 x 0.20)). In the case of a regime that provides for both a preferential rate of taxation and a permanent reduction in the tax base, the rate of taxation would be based on the preferential rate of taxation reduced by the product of such rate and the percentage reduction in the tax base.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
98. The fourth condition, described in subdivision (iv) of the definition, provides that a regime shall not be regarded as a special tax regime if it applies principally to pension funds or organisations that are established and maintained exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, artistic, cultural or educational purposes. Under subdivision (iv), a regime shall also not be regarded as a special tax regime if it applies principally to persons the taxation of which achieves a single level of taxation, either in the hands of the person or its shareholders (with at most one year of deferral), that hold a diversified portfolio of securities, that are subject to investor-protection regulation in the residence State, and interests in which are marketed primarily to retail investors. This would generally correspond to the collective investment vehicles referred to in paragraph 22 above. Another exception provided in subdivision (iv) applies to regimes that apply principally to persons the taxation of which achieves a single level of taxation, either in the hands of the person or its shareholders (with at most one year of deferral), and such persons hold predominantly immovable property.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
99. The fifth condition, described in subdivision (v) of the definition, provides that the Contracting State that wishes to treat a regime of the other State as a "special tax regime" must first consult the other Contracting State and notify that State through diplomatic channels that it has determined that the regime meets the other conditions of the definition.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
100. The final part of the definition requires that the Contracting State that wishes to treat a regime of the other State as a "special tax regime" must issue a written public notification stating that the regime satisfies the definition. For the purposes of the Convention, a special tax regime shall be treated as such 30 days after the date of such written public notification.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Provision on subsequent changes to domestic law
101. Whilst the above suggested provision on special tax regimes would address the issue of targeted tax regimes, it would not deal with changes of a more general nature which could be introduced into the domestic law of a treaty partner after the conclusion of a tax treaty and which might have prevented the conclusion of the treaty if they had existed at that time. For instance, some Contracting States might be concerned if the overall tax rate that another State levies on corporate income falls below what they consider to be acceptable for the purposes of the conclusion of a tax treaty. Some States might also be concerned if a State that taxed most types of foreign income at the time of the conclusion of a tax treaty decided subsequently to exempt such income from tax when it is derived by a resident company. The following is an example of a provision that would address these concerns, it being understood that the features of that provision would need to be restricted or extended in order to deal adequately with the specific areas of concern of each State:
1. | If at any time after the signing of this Convention, a Contracting State. |
(a) | reduces the general statutory rate of company tax that applies with respect to substantially all of the income of resident companies with the result that such rate falls below the lesser of either |
(i) | [rate to be determined bilaterally] or | |
(ii) | 60 per cent of the general statutory rate of company tax applicable in the other Contracting State, or; |
(b) | the first-mentioned Contracting State provides an exemption from taxation to resident companies for substantially all foreign source income (including interest and royalties), the Contracting States shall consult with a view to amending this Convention to restore an appropriate allocation of taxing rights between the Contracting States. If such consultations do not progress, the other State may notify the first-mentioned State through diplomatic channels that it shall cease to apply the provisions of Articles 10, 11, 12 and 21. In such case, the provisions of such Articles shall cease to have effect in both Contracting States with respect to payments to resident companies six months after the date that the other Contracting State issues a written public notification stating that it shall cease to apply the provisions of these Articles. |
2. | For the purposes of determining the general statutory rate of company tax: |
(a) | the allowance of generally available deductions based on a percentage of what otherwise would be taxable income, and other similar mechanisms to achieve a reduction in the overall rate of tax, shall be taken into account; and | |
(b) | the following shall not be taken into account: |
(i) | a tax that applies to a company only upon a distribution by such company, or that applies to shareholders; and | |
(ii) | the amount of a tax that is refundable upon the distribution by a company of a dividend. |
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
102. This suggested provision provides that if, at any time after the signing of the Convention, either Contracting State enacts certain changes to domestic law, the provisions of Articles 10, 11, 12 and 21 may cease to have effect with respect to payments to companies if, after consultation, the Contracting States fail to agree on amendments to the Convention to restore an appropriate allocation of taxing rights between the Contracting States.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
103. Paragraph 1 of the suggested provision addresses two types of subsequent changes that could be made by a State, after the signature of a tax treaty, to the tax rules applicable to companies resident of that State. The first type is when that State reduces the general statutory rate of company tax that applies with respect to substantially all of the income of its resident companies, with the result that such rate falls below the lesser of a minimum rate that would need to be determined bilaterally or 60 per cent of the general rate of company tax applicable in the other State.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
104. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the "general statutory rate of company tax" refers to the general rate of company tax provided by legislation; if rates of company taxes are graduated, it refers to the highest marginal rate, provided that such rate applies to a significantly large portion of corporate taxpayers and was not established merely to circumvent the application of this Article. A general statutory rate of company tax that is applicable to business profits generally or to so-called "trading income" (broadly defined to include income from manufacturing, services or dealing in goods or commodities) shall be treated as applying to substantially all of the income of resident companies, even if narrow categories of income (including income from portfolio investments or other passive activities) are excluded. A reduced rate of tax that applies only with respect to capital gains would not fall within the scope of this Article; the distinction between business profits and capital gains shall be made according to the domestic laws of the residence State. Paragraph 2 addresses specific issues that may arise in determining what is a State's general statutory rate of company tax. Subparagraph a) of paragraph 2 provides that paragraph 1 applies equally to reductions to the general statutory company tax rate, as well as to other changes in domestic law that would have the same effect using a different mechanism. For example, if the statutory company tax rate in a Contracting State was 20 per cent, but, after the signing of the Convention, companies resident in the Contracting State are permitted to claim deductions representing 50 per cent of what otherwise would be their taxable income, the general statutory rate of company tax would be 10 per cent (20 - (20 x 0.50)). Similarly, if the statutory company tax rate in a Contracting State was 20 per cent, but after the signing of the Convention, companies resident in the Contracting State are allowed to deduct an amount equal to a percentage of their equity up to 50 per cent of what otherwise would be their taxable income, and in general, most companies are able to utilize the maximum available deduction, the general rate of company tax would be 10 per cent. Subparagraph b) of paragraph 2 sets forth taxes that shall not be taken into account for purposes of determining the general statutory rate of company tax. First, as provided in subdivision (i) of subparagraph b), taxes imposed at either the company or shareholder level when the company distributes earnings shall not be taken into account when determining the general rate of company tax (e.g. if resident companies are not subject to any taxation at the company level until a distribution is made, the tax levied upon distribution would not be considered part of the general rate of company tax). Second, as provided in subdivision (ii) of subparagraph b), any amounts of corporate tax that under a country's domestic law would be refundable upon a company's distribution of earnings shall not be taken into account for purposes of determining the general statutory rate of company tax.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
105. The second type of subsequent change in domestic tax law covered by paragraph 1 is when a State provides an exemption from taxation to companies resident of that State with respect to substantially all foreign source income (including interest and royalties) derived by these companies. The reference to an exemption for substantially all foreign source income earned by a resident company is intended to describe a taxation system under which income (including income from interest and royalties) from sources outside a State is exempt from tax solely by reason of its source being outside that State (so-called "territorial" systems). The reference does not include taxation systems under which only foreign source dividends or business profits from foreign permanent establishments are exempt from tax by the residence State (so-called "dividend exemption" systems).
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
106. When either type of subsequent domestic law change occurs, the Contracting States shall first consult with a view to concluding amendments to the Convention to restore an appropriate allocation of taxing rights between the two Contracting States. In the event that such amendments are agreed, or that the Contracting States agree, after such consultation, that the allocation of taxing rights in the Convention is not disrupted by the relevant change made to the domestic law of one of the States, paragraph 1 has no further application. If, however, after a reasonable period of time, such consultations do not progress, the other State may notify the State whose domestic law has changed, through diplomatic channels, that it shall cease to apply the provisions of Articles 10, 11, 12 and 21. Once such diplomatic notification has been made, in order for paragraph 1 to apply, the source State must announce by written public notice that it shall cease to apply the provisions of these Articles. Six months after the date of such written public notification, the provisions of these Articles shall cease to have effect in both Contracting States with respect to payments to companies that are residents of either State.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Provision on notional deductions for equity
107. One example of a tax regime with respect to which treaty benefits might be specifically restricted relates to domestic law provisions that provide for a notional deduction with respect to equity. Contracting States which agree to prevent the application of the provisions of Article 11 to interest that is paid to connected persons who benefit from such notional deductions may do so by adding the following provision to Article 11:
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, interest arising in a Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State that is connected to the payer (as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5) may be taxed in the first-mentioned Contracting State in accordance with domestic law if such resident benefits, at any time during the taxable year in which the interest is paid, from notional deductions with respect to amounts that the Contracting State of which the beneficial owner is a resident treats as equity.
The explanations in paragraph 85 above concerning the reference to a resident that is "connected" to the payer apply equally to the above provision
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Provision on remittance based taxation
108. Another example of a tax regime with respect to which treaty benefits might be specifically restricted is that of remittance based taxation. Under the domestic law of some States, persons who qualify as residents but who do not have what is considered to be a permanent link with the State (sometimes referred to as domicile) are only taxed on income derived from sources outside the State to the extent that this income is effectively repatriated, or remitted, thereto. Such persons are not, therefore, subject to potential double taxation to the extent that foreign income is not remitted to their State of residence and it may be considered inappropriate to give them the benefit of the provisions of the Convention on such income. Contracting States which agree to restrict the application of the provisions of the Convention to income that is effectively taxed in the hands of these persons may do so by adding the following provision to the Convention:
Where under any provision of this Convention income arising in a Contracting State is relieved in whole or in part from tax in that State and under the law in force in the other Contracting State a person, in respect of the said income, is subject to tax by reference to the amount thereof which is remitted to or received in that other State and not by reference to the full amount thereof, then any relief provided by the provisions of this Convention shall apply only to so much of the income as is taxed in the other Contracting State.
In some States, the application of that provision could create administrative difficulties if a substantial amount of time elapsed between the time the income arose in a Contracting State and the time it were taxed by the other Contracting State in the hands of a resident of that other State. States concerned by these difficulties could subject the rule in the last part of the above provision, i.e. that the income in question will be entitled to benefits in the first-mentioned State only when taxed in the other State, to the condition that the income must be so taxed in that other State within a specified period of time from the time the income arises in the first-mentioned State.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Limitations of source taxation: procedural aspects
109. A number of Articles of the Convention limit the right of a State to tax income derived from its territory. As noted in paragraph 19 of the Commentary on Article 10 as concerns the taxation of dividends, the Convention does not settle procedural questions and each State is free to use the procedure provided in its domestic law in order to apply the limits provided by the Convention. A State can therefore automatically limit the tax that it levies in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, subject to possible prior verification of treaty entitlement, or it can impose the tax provided for under its domestic law and subsequently refund the part of that tax that exceeds the amount that it can levy under the provisions of the Convention. As a general rule, in order to ensure expeditious implementation of taxpayers' benefits under a treaty, the first approach is the highly preferable method. If a refund system is needed, it should be based on observable difficulties in identifying entitlement to treaty benefits. Also, where the second approach is adopted, it is extremely important that the refund be made expeditiously, especially if no interest is paid on the amount of the refund, as any undue delay in making that refund is a direct cost to the taxpayer.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Observation on the Commentary
110. With respect to paragraph 81, Switzerland considers that controlled foreign corporation legislation may, depending on the relevant concept, be contrary to the spirit of Article 7.
(Renumbered and amended on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
Reservations on the Article
111. The United States reserves the right, with certain exceptions, to tax its citizens and residents, including certain former citizens and long-term residents, without regard to the Convention.
(Renumbered on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
112. Canada reserves the right to limit the entities or arrangements covered under paragraph 2 to those that are established in one of the Contracting States.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
113. France reserves the right, in its conventions, not to include or to amend paragraph 2 in order to specify in which situations France will recognise the fiscal transparency of entities located in the other Contracting State or in a third State.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
114. Germany reserves the right not to include paragraph 2 in its conventions. (Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
115. Portugal reserves the right not to include paragraph 2 in its conventions in view of the administrative difficulties resulting from some of the solutions put forward in the report "The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships" (as indicated in the report itself in certain cases).
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
116. Ireland reserves the right not to include paragraph 3 in its conventions and to amend paragraph 2 to provide that the paragraph will not be construed to affect a Contracting State's right to tax its own residents.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
117. France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland reserve the right not to include paragraph 3 in their conventions.
(Added on 21 November 2017; see HISTORY)
HISTORY
Paragraph 1: Amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 21 September 1995 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 1 read as follows:
"1. Whereas the earliest conventions in general were applicable to "citizens" of the Contracting States, more recent conventions usually apply to "residents" of one or both of the Contracting States irrespective of nationality. Some conventions are of even wider scope because they apply more generally to "taxpayers" of the Contracting States; they are, therefore, also applicable to persons, who, although not residing in either State, are nevertheless liable to tax on part of their income or capital in each of them. It has been deemed preferable for practical reasons to provide that the Convention is to apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States. The term "resident" is defined in Article 4."
Paragraph 1 was previously amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1. In the 1977 Model Convention and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 1 read as follows:
"1. Whereas the earliest conventions in general were applicable to "citizens" of the Contracting States, more recent conventions usually apply to "residents" of one or both of the Contracting States irrespective of nationality. Some conventions are of even wider scope inasmuch they apply more generally to "taxpayers" of the Contracting States; they are, therefore, also applicable to persons, who, although not residing in either State, are nevertheless liable to tax on part of their income or capital in each of them. The Convention is intended to be applied between OECD Member countries and it has been deemed preferable for practical reasons to provide that the Convention is to apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States. The term "resident" is defined in Article 4."
Paragraph 1 was previously amended when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977. In the 1963 Draft Convention (adopted by the OECD Council on 30 July 1963) and until the adoption of the 1977 Model Convention, paragraph 1 read as follows:
"1. Whereas older Conventions in general were applicable to "citizens" of the Contracting States, recent Conventions usually apply to "residents" of one or both of the Contracting States, without distinction of nationality. Some Conventions are of even wider scope inasmuch as they apply more generally to "taxpayers" of the Contracting States; they are, therefore, also applicable to persons, who, although not residing in either State, are nevertheless liable to tax on part of their income or capital in each of them. The Convention is intended to be applied between Member countries of the O.E.C.D. and it has been deemed preferable for practical reasons to provide that the Convention is to apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States. It is recalled that the meaning of the term "resident" is defined in Article 4 concerning fiscal domicile."
Paragraph 2: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 2 and the preceding heading were deleted and a new paragraph 2 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 2 and the heading that preceded it read as follows:
"Application of the Convention to partnerships
2. Domestic laws differ in the treatment of partnerships. These differences create various difficulties when applying tax Conventions in relation to partnerships. These difficulties are analysed in the report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships",1 the conclusions of which have been incorporated below and in the Commentary on various other provisions of the Model Tax Convention.
1 Reproduced in Volume II at page R(15)-1."
Paragraph 2 was previously replaced on 29 April 2000 when the second sentence of paragraph 2 of the 1977 Model was incorporated into an amended paragraph 3 and a new paragraph 2 was added by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999). In the 1977 Model Convention and until 29 April 2000, paragraph 2 read as follows:
"2. The domestic laws of the various OECD Member countries differ in the treatment of partnerships. The main issue of such differences is founded on the fact that some countries treat partnerships as taxable units (sometimes even as companies) whereas other countries disregard the partnership and tax only the individual partners on their shares of the partnership income."
Paragraph 2 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 3: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 3 was deleted and a new paragraph 3 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 3 read as follows:
"3. As discussed in that report, a main source of difficulties is the fact that some countries treat partnerships as taxable units (sometimes even as companies) whereas other countries adopt what may be referred to as the fiscally transparent approach, under which the partnership is ignored for tax purposes and the individual partners are taxed on their respective share of the partnership's income."
Paragraph 3 was previously replaced on 29 April 2000 when part of the previous paragraph 3 was incorporated in paragraph 5 and a new paragraph 3 was added by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999). After 21 September 1995 and until 29 April 2000, paragraph 3 read as follows:
"3. These differences in views have many effects on the application of the Convention in the case of partnerships, especially where one or more partners are not residents of the State in which the partnership was created or organised. First, the question arises whether a partnership as such may invoke the provisions of the Convention. Where a partnership is treated as a company or taxed in the same way, it may reasonably be argued that the partnership is a resident of the Contracting State taxing the partnership on the grounds mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 4 and therefore, falling under the scope of the Convention, is entitled to the benefits of the Convention. In the other instances mentioned in paragraph 2 above, the application of the Convention to the partnership as such might be refused, at least if no special rule covering partnerships is provided for in the Convention."
Paragraph 3 was amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1. In the 1977 Model Convention and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 3 read as follows:
"3. These differences in views have many effects on the application of the Convention in the case of partnerships, especially where one or more partners are not residents of the State in which the partnership was created or organised. First the question arises whether a partnership as such may invoke the provisions of the Convention. Where a partnership is treated as a company or taxed in the same way, it may reasonably be argued that the partnership is a resident of the Contracting State taxing the partnership on the grounds mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 4 and therefore, falling under the scope of the Convention, is entitled to the benefits of the Convention. In the other instances mentioned in paragraph 2 above, the application of the Convention to the partnership as such might be refused, at least if no special rule is provided for in the Convention covering partnerships."
Paragraph 3 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 4: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 4 was deleted and a new paragraph 4 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 4 read as follows:
"4. A first difficulty is the extent to which a partnership is entitled as such to the benefits of the provisions of the Convention. Under Article 1, only persons who are residents of the Contracting States are entitled to the benefits of the tax Convention entered into by these States. While paragraph 2 of the Commentary on Article 3 explains why a partnership constitutes a person, a partnership does not necessarily qualify as a resident of a Contracting State under Article 4."
Paragraph 4 was previously replaced on 29 April 2000 when paragraph 4 was deleted and a new paragraph 4 was added by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999). In the 1977 Model Convention and until 29 April 2000, paragraph 4 read as follows:
"4. Moreover, different rules of the Convention may be applied in the Contracting States to income derived by a partner from the partnership, depending on the approach of such States. In States where partnerships are treated as companies, distributions of profits to the partners may be considered to be dividends (paragraph 3 of Article 10), whilst for other States all profits of a partnership, whether distributed or not, are considered as business profits of the partners (Article 7). In many States, business profits of partnerships include, for tax purposes, all or some special remuneration paid by a partnership to its partners (such as rents, interest, royalties, remuneration for services), whilst in other States such payments are not dealt with as business profits (Article 7) but under other headings (in the above-mentioned examples: Articles 6, 11, 12, 14 and 15, respectively)."
Paragraph 4 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 5: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 5 was deleted and a new paragraph 5 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 17 July 2008 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 5 read as follows:
"5. Where a partnership is treated as a company or taxed in the same way, it is a resident of the Contracting State that taxes the partnership on the grounds mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 4 and, therefore, it is entitled to the benefits of the Convention. Where, however, a partnership is treated as fiscally transparent in a State, the partnership is not "liable to tax" in that State within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 4, and so cannot be a resident thereof for purposes of the Convention. In such a case, the application of the Convention to the partnership as such would be refused, unless a special rule covering partnerships were provided for in the Convention. Where the application of the Convention is so refused, the partners should be entitled, with respect to their share of the income of the partnership, to the benefits provided by the Conventions entered into by the States of which they are residents to the extent that the partnership's income is allocated to them for the purposes of taxation in their State of residence (see paragraph 8.8 of the Commentary on Article 4)."
Paragraph 5 as it read before 21 November 2017 was amended on 17 July 2008, by replacing the cross-reference to "paragraph 8.4 of the Commentary on Article 4" by "paragraph 8.7 of the Commentary on Article 4", by the report entitled "The 2008 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 17 July 2008. After 29 April 2000 and until 17 July 2008, paragraph 5 read as follows:
"5. Where a partnership is treated as a company or taxed in the same way, it is a resident of the Contracting State that taxes the partnership on the grounds mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 4 and, therefore, it is entitled to the benefits of the Convention. Where, however, a partnership is treated as fiscally transparent in a State, the partnership is not "liable to tax" in that State within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 4, and so cannot be a resident thereof for purposes of the Convention. In such a case, the application of the Convention to the partnership as such would be refused, unless a special rule covering partnerships were provided for in the Convention. Where the application of the Convention is so refused, the partners should be entitled, with respect to their share of the income of the partnership, to the benefits provided by the Conventions entered into by the States of which they are residents to the extent that the partnership's income is allocated to them for the purposes of taxation in their State of residence (see paragraph 8.4 of the Commentary on Article 4)."
Paragraph 5 was replaced on 29 April 2000 when it was deleted and a new paragraph 5 was added by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999). The new paragraph 5 incorporated, with amendments, the second sentence of paragraph 3 of the 1977 Model Convention (see history of paragraph 3). In the 1977 Model Convention and until 29 April 2000, paragraph 5 read as follows:
"5. Finally the capital invested in a partnership or the alienation of a participation in a partnership may be treated, depending on the approach, under paragraph 2 of Articles 22 and 13 (permanent establishment) or paragraph 4 of Articles 22 and 13 (other movable property)."
Paragraph 5 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 6: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 6 was deleted and a new paragraph 6 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6 read as follows:
"6. The relationship between the partnership's entitlement to the benefits of a tax Convention and that of the partners raises other questions."
Paragraph 6 was previously replaced on 29 April 2000 when paragraph 6 was deleted and a new paragraph 6 was added by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999). After 23 July 1992 and until 29 April 2000, paragraph 6 read as follows:
"6. The concurrent application of different Articles of the Convention in the two Contracting States (or even the non-application of the Convention in one of them) may result not only in double taxation, but also in non-taxation. However the practical application of double taxation conventions, whether or not based on the Model Convention, and discussions in the Committee on Fiscal Affairs when the 1977 Model Convention was being drafted have shown that the opinions of the OECD Member countries differ too much and that it is extremely difficult to find a uniform solution that would be acceptable to all or even to the great majority of Member countries. The Convention does not, therefore, contain any special provisions relating to partnerships. Contracting States are however left free to examine the problems of partnerships in their bilateral negotiations and to agree upon such special provisions as they may find necessary and appropriate."
Paragraph 6 was amended on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992. In the 1977 Model Convention and until 23 July 1992, paragraph 6 read as follows:
"6. The concurrent application of different Articles of the Convention in the two Contracting States (or even the non-application of the Convention in one of them) may not only result in double taxation, but also in non-taxation. However the practical application of double taxation conventions, whether or not based on the 1963 Draft Convention, and the discussions on the revision of the 1963 Draft Convention have shown that the opinions of the OECD Member countries differ too much and that it is extremely difficult to find a uniform solution which would be acceptable to all or even to the great majority of Member countries. The Convention does not, therefore, contain any special provisions relating to partnerships. Contracting States are however left free to examine the problems of partnerships in their bilateral negotiations and to agree upon such special provisions as they may find necessary and appropriate."
Paragraph 6 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 6.1: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.1 read as follows:
"6.1 One issue is the effect that the application of the provisions of the Convention to a partnership can have on the taxation of the partners. Where a partnership is treated as a resident of a Contracting State, the provisions of the Convention that restrict the other Contracting State's right to tax the partnership on its income do not apply to restrict that other State's right to tax the partners who are its own residents on their share of the income of the partnership. Some states may wish to include in their conventions a provision that expressly confirms a Contracting State's right to tax resident partners on their share of the income of a partnership that is treated as a resident of the other State."
Paragraph 6.1 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999).
Paragraph 6.2: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.2 read as follows:
"6.2 Another issue is that of the effect of the provisions of the Convention on a Contracting State's right to tax income arising on its territory where the entitlement to the benefits of one, or more than one, Conventions is different for the partners and the partnership. Where, for instance, the State of source treats a domestic partnership as fiscally transparent and therefore taxes the partners on their share of the income of the partnership, a partner that is resident of a State that taxes partnerships as companies would not be able to claim the benefits of the Convention between the two States with respect to the share of the partnership's income that the State of source taxes in his hands since that income, though allocated to the person claiming the benefits of the Convention under the laws of the State of source, is not similarly allocated for purposes of determining the liability to tax on that item of income in the State of residence of that person."
Paragraph 6.2 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999).
Paragraph 6.3: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.3 read as follows:
"6.3 The results described in the preceding paragraph should obtain even if, as a matter of the domestic law of the State of source, the partnership would not be regarded as transparent for tax purposes but as a separate taxable entity to which the income would be attributed, provided that the partnership is not actually considered as a resident of the State of source. This conclusion is founded upon the principle that the State of source should take into account, as part of the factual context in which the Convention is to be applied, the way in which an item of income, arising in its jurisdiction, is treated in the jurisdiction of the person claiming the benefits of the Convention as a resident. For States which could not agree with this interpretation of the Article, it would be possible to provide for this result in a special provision which would avoid the resulting potential double taxation where the income of the partnership is differently allocated by the two States."
Paragraph 6.3 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999).
Paragraph 6.4: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.4 read as follows:
"6.4 Where, as described in paragraph 6.2, income has "flowed through" a transparent partnership to the partners who are liable to tax on that income in the State of their residence then the income is appropriately viewed as "paid" to the partners since it is to them and not to the partnership that the income is allocated for purposes of determining their tax liability in their State of residence. Hence the partners, in these circumstances, satisfy the condition, imposed in several Articles, that the income concerned is "paid to a resident of the other Contracting State". Similarly the requirement, imposed by some other Articles, that income or gains are "derived by a resident of the other Contracting State" is met in the circumstances described above. This interpretation avoids denying the benefits of tax Conventions to a partnership's income on the basis that neither the partnership, because it is not a resident, nor the partners, because the income is not directly paid to them or derived by them, can claim the benefits of the Convention with respect to that income. Following from the principle discussed in paragraph 6.3, the conditions that the income be paid to, or derived by, a resident should be considered to be satisfied even where, as a matter of the domestic law of the State of source, the partnership would not be regarded as transparent for tax purposes, provided that the partnership is not actually considered as a resident of the State of source."
Paragraph 6.4 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999).
Paragraph 6.5: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.5 read as follows:
"6.5 Partnership cases involving three States pose difficult problems with respect to the determination of entitlement to benefits under Conventions. However, many problems may be solved through the application of the principles described in paragraphs 6.2 to 6.4. Where a partner is a resident of one State, the partnership is established in another State and the partner shares in partnership income arising in a third State then the partner may claim the benefits of the Convention between his State of residence and the State of source of the income to the extent that the partnership's income is allocated to him for the purposes of taxation in his State of residence. If, in addition, the partnership is taxed as a resident of the State in which it is established then the partnership may itself claim the benefits of the Convention between the State in which it is established and the State of source. In such a case of "double benefits", the State of source may not impose taxation which is inconsistent with the terms of either applicable Convention; therefore, where different rates are provided for in the two Conventions, the lower will be applied. However, Contracting States may wish to consider special provisions to deal with the administration of benefits under Conventions in situations such as these, so that the partnership may claim benefits but partners could not present concurrent claims. Such provisions could ensure appropriate and simplified administration of the giving of benefits. No benefits will be available under the Convention between the State in which the partnership is established and the State of source if the partnership is regarded as transparent for tax purposes by the State in which it is established. Similarly no benefits will be available under the Convention between the State of residence of the partner and the State of source if the income of the partnership is not allocated to the partner under the taxation law of the State of residence. If the partnership is regarded as transparent for tax purposes by the State in which it is established and the income of the partnership is not allocated to the partner under the taxation law of the State of residence of the partner, the State of source may tax partnership income allocable to the partner without restriction."
Paragraph 6.5 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999).
Paragraph 6.6: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.6 read as follows:
"6.6 Differences in how countries apply the fiscally transparent approach may create other difficulties for the application of tax Conventions. Where a State considers that a partnership does not qualify as a resident of a Contracting State because it is not liable to tax and the partners are liable to tax in their State of residence on their share of the partnership's income, it is expected that that State will apply the provisions of the Convention as if the partners had earned the income directly so that the classification of the income for purposes of the allocative rules of Articles 6 to 21 will not be modified by the fact that the income flows through the partnership. Difficulties may arise, however, in the application of provisions which refer to the activities of the taxpayer, the nature of the taxpayer, the relationship between the taxpayer and another party to a transaction. Some of these difficulties are discussed in paragraph 19.1 of the Commentary on Article 5 and paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 of the Commentary on Article 15."
Paragraph 6.6 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999).
Paragraph 6.7: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.7 read as follows:
"6.7 Finally, a number of other difficulties arise where different rules of the Convention are applied by the Contracting States to income derived by a partnership or its partners, depending on the domestic laws of these States or their interpretation of the provisions of the Convention or of the relevant facts. These difficulties relate to the broader issue of conflicts of qualification, which is dealt with in paragraphs 32.1 ff. and 56.1 ff. of the Commentary on Article 23."
Paragraph 6.7 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000, on the basis of Annex I of another report entitled "The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 20 January 1999).
Paragraph 6.8: Renumbered as paragraph 22 (see history of paragraph 22) and the preceding heading was moved with it on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.9: Renumbered as paragraph 23 (see history of paragraph 23) and the preceding heading was moved with it on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.10: Renumbered as paragraph 24 (see history of paragraph 24) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.11: Renumbered as paragraph 25 (see history of paragraph 25) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.12: Renumbered as paragraph 26 (see history of paragraph 26) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.13: Renumbered as paragraph 27 (see history of paragraph 27) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.14: Renumbered as paragraph 28 (see history of paragraph 28) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.15: Renumbered as paragraph 29 (see history of paragraph 29) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.16: Renumbered as paragraph 30 (see history of paragraph 30) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.17: Renumbered as paragraph 31 (see history of paragraph 31) and the preceding heading was moved with it on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.18: Renumbered as paragraph 32 (see history of paragraph 32) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.19: Renumbered as paragraph 33 (see history of paragraph 33) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.20: Renumbered as paragraph 34 (see history of paragraph 34) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.21: Renumbered as paragraph 35 (see history of paragraph 35) and amended by updating cross-references on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. At that time the preceding heading was moved with paragraph 6.21.
Paragraph 6.22: Renumbered as paragraph 36 (see history of paragraph 36) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.23: Renumbered as paragraph 37 (see history of paragraph 37) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.24: Renumbered as paragraph 38 (see history of paragraph 38) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.25: Renumbered as paragraph 39 (see history of paragraph 39) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.26: Renumbered as paragraph 40 (see history of paragraph 40) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.27: Renumbered as paragraph 41 (see history of paragraph 41) and amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.28: Renumbered as paragraph 42 (see history of paragraph 42) and amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.29: Renumbered as paragraph 43 (see history of paragraph 43) and amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.30: Renumbered as paragraph 44 (see history of paragraph 44) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.31: Renumbered as paragraph 45 (see history of paragraph 45) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.32: Renumbered as paragraph 46 (see history of paragraph 46) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.33: Renumbered as paragraph 47 (see history of paragraph 47) and amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.34: Renumbered as paragraph 48 (see history of paragraph 48) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.35: Renumbered as paragraph 49 (see history of paragraph 49) and the preceding heading was moved with it on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.36: Renumbered as paragraph 50 (see history of paragraph 50) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.37: Renumbered as paragraph 51 (see history of paragraph 51) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.38: Renumbered as paragraph 52 (see history of paragraph 52) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.39: Renumbered as paragraph 53 (see history of paragraph 53) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 7: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 7 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 54 (see history of paragraph 54) and a new paragraph 7 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. At that time the heading preceding paragraph 7 was moved with it.
Paragraph 7.1: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 7.1 read as follows:
"7.1 Taxpayers may be tempted to abuse the tax laws of a State by exploiting the differences between various countries' laws. Such attempts may be countered by provisions or jurisprudential rules that are part of the domestic law of the State concerned. Such a State is then unlikely to agree to provisions of bilateral double taxation conventions that would have the effect of allowing abusive transactions that would otherwise be prevented by the provisions and rules of this kind contained in its domestic law. Also, it will not wish to apply its bilateral conventions in a way that would have that effect."
Paragraph 7.1 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 8: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 8 was deleted and a new paragraph 8 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 8 read as follows:
"8. It is also important to note that the extension of double taxation conventions increases the risk of abuse by facilitating the use of artificial legal constructions aimed at securing the benefits of both the tax advantages available under certain domestic laws and the reliefs from tax provided for in double taxation conventions."
Paragraph 8 was previously replaced on 28 January 2003 when paragraph 8 was deleted and a new paragraph 8 was added by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003. After 21 September 1995 and until January 2003, paragraph 8 read as follows:
"8. Moreover, the extension of the network of double taxation conventions still reinforces the impact of such manoeuvres by making it possible, using artificial legal constructions, to benefit both from the tax advantages available under domestic laws and the tax relief provided for in double taxation conventions."
Paragraph 8 was amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1. In the 1977 Model Convention and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 8 read as follows:
"8. Moreover, the extension of the network of double taxation conventions still reinforces the impact of such manoeuvres by making it possible, through the creation of usually artificial legal constructions, to benefit both from the tax advantages available under domestic laws and the tax relief provided for in double taxation conventions."
Paragraph 8 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 9: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 9 was renumbered as paragraph 56 (see history of paragraph 56) and a new paragraph 9 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 9.1: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 9.1 read as follows:
"9.1 This raises two fundamental questions that are discussed in the following paragraphs:
— | whether the benefits of tax conventions must be granted when transactions that constitute an abuse of the provisions of these conventions are entered into (see paragraphs 9.2 and following below); and | |
— | whether specific provisions and jurisprudential rules of the domestic law of a Contracting State that are intended to prevent tax abuse conflict with tax conventions (see paragraphs 22 and following below)." |
Paragraph 9.1 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 9.2: Renumbered as paragraph 58 (see history of paragraph 58) and amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 9.3: Renumbered as paragraph 59 (see history of paragraph 59) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 9.4: Renumbered as paragraph 60 (see history of paragraph 60) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 9.5: Renumbered as paragraph 61 (see history of paragraph 61) and amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 9.6: Renumbered as paragraph 62 (see history of paragraph 62) and amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 10: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 10 was renumbered as paragraph 63 (see history of paragraph 63) and a new paragraph 10 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 10.1: Renumbered as paragraph 64 (see history of paragraph 64) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 10.2: Renumbered as paragraph 65 (see history of paragraph 65) on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 11: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 11 was deleted and a new paragraph 11 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 11 read as follows:
"11. A further example is provided by two particularly prevalent forms of improper use of the Convention which are discussed in two reports from the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies" and "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies".1 As indicated in these reports, the concern expressed in paragraph 9 above has proved to be valid as there has been a growing tendency toward the use of conduit companies to obtain treaty benefits not intended by the Contracting States in their bilateral negotiations. This has led an increasing number of member countries to implement treaty provisions (both general and specific) to counter abuse and to preserve anti-avoidance legislation in their domestic laws.
1These two reports are reproduced in Volume II at pages R(5)-1 and R(6)-1."
Paragraph 11 was amended on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002). After 21 September 1995 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 11 read as follows:
"11. Improper uses of the Convention are discussed in two reports from the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies" and "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies". As indicated in these reports, the concern expressed in paragraph 9 above has proved to be valid as there has been a growing tendency toward the use of conduit companies to obtain treaty benefits not intended by the Contracting States in their bilateral negotiations. This has led an increasing number of Member countries to implement treaty provisions (both general and specific) to counter abuse and to preserve anti-avoidance legislation in their domestic laws."
Paragraph 11 was previously amended on 23 October 1997, by replacing the footnote to the paragraph, by the report entitled "The 1997 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 October 1997. After 23 July 1992 and until 23 October 1997, the footnote read as follows:
"1 These and two other reports were published in 1987 under the joint title International Tax Avoidance and Evasion — Four Related Studies, in "Issues of International Taxation" No. 1, OECD, Paris, 1987."
Paragraph 11 was previously amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1. After 23 July 1992 and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 11 read as follows:
"11. Such improper uses of the Convention are discussed in two reports from the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies" and "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies". As indicated in these reports, the concern expressed in paragraph 9 above has proved to be valid as there has been a growing tendency for the use of conduit companies to obtain treaty benefits not intended by the Contracting States in their bilateral negotiations. This has led an increasing number of Member countries to implement treaty provisions (both general and specific) to counter abuse and to preserve anti-avoidance legislation in their domestic laws."
Paragraph 11 as it read after 23 July 1992 replaced paragraph 11 of the 1977 Model Convention, which was renumbered as paragraph 28 (see history of paragraph 28) by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992.
Paragraph 12: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 12 was deleted and a new paragraph 12 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 12 read as follows:
"12. The treaty provisions that have been designed to cover these and other forms of abuse take different forms. The following are examples derived from provisions that have been incorporated in bilateral conventions concluded by member countries. These provide models that treaty negotiators might consider when searching for a solution to specific cases. In referring to them there should be taken into account:
— | the fact that these provisions are not mutually exclusive and that various provisions may be needed in order to address different concerns; | |
— | the degree to which tax advantages may actually be obtained by a particular avoidance strategy; | |
— | the legal context in both Contracting States and, in particular, the extent to which domestic law already provides an appropriate response to this avoidance strategy, and | |
— | the extent to which bona fide economic activities might be unintentionally disqualified by such provisions." |
Paragraph 12 was amended on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002). After 21 September 1995 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 12 read as follows:
"12. Several solutions have been considered but, for the reasons set out in the above-mentioned reports, no definitive texts have been drafted, no strict recommendations as to the circumstances in which they should be applied made, and no exhaustive list of such possible counter-measures given. The texts quoted below are merely intended as suggested benchmarks that treaty negotiators might consider when searching for a solution to specific cases. In referring to them there should be taken into account:
— | the degree to which tax advantages may actually be obtained by conduit companies; | |
— | the legal context in both Contracting States, and | |
— | the extent to which bona fide economic activities might be unintentionally disqualified by such provisions." |
Paragraph 12 was previously amended on 21 September 1995, by replacing the words "the extent to which" with "the scope of" in the third subparagraph, when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made. After 23 July 1992 and until 21 September 1995, the third subparagraph of paragraph 12 read as follows:
"— | the scope of bona fide economic activities might be unintentionally disqualified by such provisions." |
Paragraph 12 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 22 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 13: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 13 and the heading that preceded it were deleted and a new paragraph 13 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 13 and the heading that preceded it read as follows:
"Conduit company cases
13. Many countries have attempted to deal with the issue of conduit companies and various approaches have been designed for that purpose. One solution would be to disallow treaty benefits to a company not owned, directly or indirectly, by residents of the State of which the company is a resident. For example, such a "look-through" provision might have the following wording:
A company that is a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled to relief from taxation under this Convention with respect to any item of income, gains or profits if it is owned or controlled directly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, by persons who are not residents of a Contracting State.
Contracting States wishing to adopt such a provision may also want, in their bilateral negotiations, to determine the criteria according to which a company would be considered as owned or controlled by non-residents."
Paragraph 13 was amended and the heading preceding it was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002). After 21 September 1995 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 13 read as follows:
"13. A solution to the problem of conduit companies would be to disallow treaty benefits to a company not owned, directly or indirectly, by residents of the State of which the company is a resident. For example, such a "look-through" provision might have the following wording:
"A company that is a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled to relief from taxation under this Convention with respect to any item of income, gains or profits if it is owned or controlled directly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, by persons who are not residents of a Contracting State."
Contracting States wishing to adopt such a provision may also want, in their bilateral negotiations, to determine the criteria according to which a company would be considered as owned or controlled by non-residents."
Paragraph 13 was previously amended on 21 September 1995, by deleting the words "insofar as the company" from the first sentence, when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made. After 31 March 1994 and until 21 September 1995, the first sentence of paragraph 13 read as follows:
"13. A solution to the problem of conduit companies would be to disallow treaty benefits to a company insofar as the company is not owned, directly or indirectly, by residents of the State of which the company is a resident."
Paragraph 13 was previously amended on 31 March 1994, by replacing the words "the first-mentioned State" with "a Contracting State" at the end of the suggested provision, by the report entitled "1994 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 31 March 1994. After 23 July 1992 and until 31 March 1994, paragraph 13 read as follows:
"13. A solution to the problem of conduit companies would be to disallow treaty benefits to a company insofar as the company is not owned, directly or indirectly, by residents of the State of which the company is a resident. For example, such a "look-through" provision might have the following wording:
"A company which is a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled to relief from taxation under this Convention with respect to any item of income, gains or profits unless it is neither owned nor controlled directly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, by persons who are not residents of the first mentioned State."
Contracting States wishing to adopt such a provision may also want, in their bilateral negotiations, to determine the criteria according to which a company would be considered as owned or controlled by non-residents."
Paragraph 13 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 23 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 14: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 14 was deleted and a new paragraph 14 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 14 read as follows:
"14. The "look-through approach" underlying the above provision seems an adequate basis for treaties with countries that have no or very low taxation and where little substantive business activities would normally be carried on. Even in these cases it might be necessary to alter the provision or to substitute for it another one to safeguard bona fide business activities."
Paragraph 14 was amended on 28 January 2003, by adding the "words underlying the above provision", by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002). After 21 September 1995 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 14 read as follows:
"14. The "look-through approach" seems an adequate basis for treaties with countries that have no or very low taxation and where little substantive business activities would normally be carried on. Even in these cases it might be necessary to alter the provision or to substitute for it another one to safeguard bona fide business activities."
Paragraph 14 was previously amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1. After 23 July 1992 and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 14 read as follows:
"14. The "look-through approach" seems an adequate basis for treaties with countries which have no or very low taxation and where little substantive business activities would normally be carried on. Even in these cases it would be necessary to alter the provision or to substitute for it another one to safeguard bona fide business activities."
Paragraph 14 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 25 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 15: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 15 was deleted and a new paragraph 15 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 15 read as follows:
"15. General subject-to-tax provisions provide that treaty benefits in the State of source are granted only if the income in question is subject to tax in the State of residence. This corresponds basically to the aim of tax treaties, namely to avoid double taxation. For a number of reasons, however, the Model Convention does not recommend such a general provision. Whilst this seems adequate with respect to a normal international relationship, a subject-to-tax approach might well be adopted in a typical conduit situation. A safeguarding provision of this kind could have the following wording:
Where income arising in a Contracting State is received by a company resident of the other Contracting State and one or more persons not resident in that other Contracting State
(a) | have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, a substantial interest in such company, in the form of a participation or otherwise, or | |
(b) | exercise directly or indirectly, alone or together, the management or control of such company, |
any provision of this Convention conferring an exemption from, or a reduction of, tax shall apply only to income that is subject to tax in the last-mentioned State under the ordinary rules of its tax law.
The concept of "substantial interest" may be further specified when drafting a bilateral convention. Contracting States may express it, for instance, as a percentage of the capital or of the voting rights of the company."
Paragraph 15 as it read after 28 January 2003 corresponded to previous paragraph 17. On that date paragraph 15 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 21 (see history of paragraph 21) and paragraph 17 was renumbered as paragraph 15 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 17 was amended on 23 October 1997, by replacing the word "and" by "or" at the end of subparagraph a) of the suggested provision included in the paragraph, by the report entitled "The 1997 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 October 1997. After 23 July 1992 and until 23 October 1997, subparagraph a) of the suggested provision included in paragraph 17 read as follows:
"(a) | have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, a substantial interest in such company, in the form of a participation or otherwise, and." |
Paragraph 17 was previously amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1. The amendment replaced the words "only if the respective income" with "only if the income" in the first sentence and replaced the words "in terms of a certain percentage" with "as a percentage" in the first sentence.
Paragraph 17 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 29 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 16: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 16 was deleted and a new paragraph 16 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 16 read as follows:
"16. The subject-to-tax approach seems to have certain merits. It may be used in the case of States with a well-developed economic structure and a complex tax law. It will, however, be necessary to supplement this provision by inserting bona fide provisions in the treaty to provide for the necessary flexibility (see paragraph 19 below); moreover, such an approach does not offer adequate protection against advanced tax avoidance schemes such as "stepping-stone strategies"."
Paragraph 16 as it read after 28 January 2003 corresponded to previous paragraph 18. On that date paragraph 16 was renumbered as paragraph 21.1 (see history of paragraph 21.1) and paragraph 18 was renumbered as paragraph 16 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 18 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 36 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 17: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 17 was deleted and a new paragraph 17 was added together with the heading preceding it by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 17 read as follows:
"17. The approaches referred to above are in many ways unsatisfactory. They refer to the changing and complex tax laws of the Contracting States and not to the arrangements giving rise to the improper use of conventions. It has been suggested that the conduit problem be dealt with in a more straightforward way by inserting a provision that would single out cases of improper use with reference to the conduit arrangements themselves (the channel approach). Such a provision might have the following wording:
Where income arising in a Contracting State is received by a company that is a resident of the other Contracting State and one or more persons who are not residents of that other Contracting State
(a) | have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, a substantial interest in such company, in the form of a participation or otherwise, or | |
(b) | exercise directly or indirectly, alone or together, the management or control of such company |
any provision of this Convention conferring an exemption from, or a reduction of, tax shall not apply if more than 50 per cent of such income is used to satisfy claims by such persons (including interest, royalties, development, advertising, initial and travel expenses, and depreciation of any kind of business assets including those on immaterial goods and processes)."
Paragraph 17 as it read after 28 January 2003 corresponded to paragraph 19. On that date paragraph 17 was renumbered as paragraph 15 (see history of paragraph 15) and paragraph 19 was renumbered as paragraph 17 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 19 was amended on 23 October 1997, by replacing the word "and" by "or" at the end of subparagraph a) of the suggested provision included in the paragraph, by the report entitled "The 1997 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 October 1997. After 23 July 1992 and until 23 October 1997, subparagraph a) of the suggested provision included in paragraph 19 read as follows:
"a) | have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, a substantial interest in such company, in the form of a participation or otherwise, and." |
Paragraph 19 was previously amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1.This included replacing the word "which" with "that" in the third sentence and by deleting ", etc" at the end of the paragraph.
Paragraph 19 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 37 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 18: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 18 was deleted and a new paragraph 18 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 18 read as follows:
"18. A provision of this kind appears to be the only effective way of combatting "stepping-stone" devices. It is found in bilateral treaties entered into by Switzerland and the United States and its principle also seems to underly the Swiss provisions against the improper use of tax treaties by certain types of Swiss companies. States that consider including a clause of this kind in their convention should bear in mind that it may cover normal business transactions and would therefore have to be supplemented by a bona fide clause."
Paragraph 18 as it read after 28 January 2003 corresponded to previous paragraph 20. On that date paragraph 18 was renumbered as paragraph 16 (see history of paragraph 16) and paragraph 20 was renumbered as paragraph 18 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 20 was amended on 21 September 1995, by replacing the word "which" with "that" in the first sentence, on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1.
Paragraph 20 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 41 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 19: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 19 was deleted and a new paragraph 19 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 19 read as follows:
"19. The solutions described above are of a general nature and they need to be accompanied by specific provisions to ensure that treaty benefits will be granted in bona fide cases. Such provisions could have the following wording:
(a) | General bona fide provision | |
"The foregoing provisions shall not apply where the company establishes that the principal purpose of the company, the conduct of its business and the acquisition or maintenance by it of the shareholding or other property from which the income in question is derived, are motivated by sound business reasons and do not have as primary purpose the obtaining of any benefits under this Convention." | ||
(b) | Activity provision | |
"The foregoing provisions shall not apply where the company is engaged in substantive business operations in the Contracting State of which it is a resident and the relief from taxation claimed from the other Contracting State is with respect to income that is connected with such operations." | ||
(c) | Amount of tax provision | |
"The foregoing provisions shall not apply where the reduction of tax claimed is not greater than the tax actually imposed by the Contracting State of which the company is a resident." | ||
(d) | Stock exchange provision | |
"The foregoing provisions shall not apply to a company that is a resident of a Contracting State if the principal class of its shares is registered on an approved stock exchange in a Contracting State or if such company is wholly owned — directly or through one or more companies each of which is a resident of the first-mentioned State — by a company which is a resident of the first-mentioned State and the principal class of whose shares is so registered." | ||
(e) | Alternative relief provision | |
"In cases where an anti-abuse clause refers to non-residents of a Contracting State, it could be provided that the term "shall not be deemed to include residents of third States that have income tax conventions in force with the Contracting State from which relief from taxation is claimed and such conventions provide relief from taxation not less than the relief from taxation claimed under this Convention." |
These provisions illustrate possible approaches. The specific wording of the provisions to be included in a particular treaty depends on the general approach taken in that treaty and should be determined on a bilateral basis. Also, where the competent authorities of the Contracting States have the power to apply discretionary provisions, it may be considered appropriate to include an additional rule that would give the competent authority of the source country the discretion to allow the benefits of the Convention to a resident of the other State even if the resident fails to pass any of the tests described above."
Paragraph 19 as it read after 28 January 2003 corresponded to previous paragraph 21. On that date paragraph 19 was renumbered as paragraph 17 (see history of paragraph 17) and paragraph 21 was renumbered as paragraph 19 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 21 was amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1.After 23 July 1992 and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 21 read as follows:
"21. The solutions described above are of a general nature and they need to be accompanied by specific provisions to ensure that treaty benefits will be granted in bona fide cases. Such provisions could have the following wording:
(a) | General bona fide provision | |
"The foregoing provisions shall not apply where the company establishes that the principal purpose of the company, the conduct of its business and the acquisition or maintenance by it of the shareholding or other property from which the income in question is derived, are motivated by sound business reasons and do not have as primary purpose the obtaining of any benefits under this Convention." | ||
(b) | Activity provision | |
"The foregoing provisions shall not apply where the company is engaged in substantive business operations in the Contracting State of which it is a resident and the relief from taxation claimed from the other Contracting State is with respect to income that is connected with such operations." | ||
(c) | Amount of tax provision | |
"The foregoing provisions shall not apply where the reduction of tax claimed is not greater than the tax actually imposed by the Contracting State of which the company is a resident." | ||
(d) | Stock exchange provision | |
"The foregoing provisions shall not apply to a company that is a resident of a Contracting State if the principal class of its shares is registered on an approved stock exchange in a Contracting State or if such company is wholly owned — directly or through one or more companies each of which is a resident of the first-mentioned State — by a company which is a resident of the first-mentioned State and the principal class of whose shares is so registered." | ||
(e) | Alternative relief provision | |
"In cases where an anti-abuse clause refers to non-residents of a Contracting State, it could be provided that the term "shall not be deemed to include residents of third States that have income tax conventions in force with the Contracting State from which relief from taxation is claimed and such conventions provide relief from taxation not less than the relief from taxation claimed under this Convention"." |
These provisions illustrate possible approaches. The specific wording of the provisions to be included in a particular treaty depends on the general approach taken in that treaty and should be determined on a bilateral basis. Also, where the competent authorities of the Contracting States have the power to apply discretionary provisions, it may be considered appropriate to include an additional rule that would give the competent authority of the source country the discretion to allow the benefits of the Convention to a resident of the other State even if the resident fails to pass any of the tests described above."
Paragraph 21 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 42 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 20: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 20 was deleted and a new paragraph 20 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 20 read as follows:
"20. Whilst the preceding paragraphs identify different approaches to deal with conduit situations, each of them deals with a particular aspect of the problem commonly referred to as "treaty shopping". States wishing to address the issue in a comprehensive way may want to consider the following example of detailed limitation-of-benefits provisions aimed at preventing persons who are not resident of either Contracting States from accessing the benefits of a Convention through the use of an entity that would otherwise qualify as a resident of one of these States, keeping in mind that adaptations may be necessary and that many States prefer other approaches to deal with treaty shopping:
1. | Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a resident of a Contracting State who derives income from the other Contracting State shall be entitled to all the benefits of this Convention otherwise accorded to residents of a Contracting State only if such resident is a "qualified person" as defined in paragraph 2 and meets the other conditions of this Convention for the obtaining of such benefits. | |
2. | A resident of a Contracting State is a qualified person for a fiscal year only if such resident is either: |
(a) | an individual; | |
(b) | a qualified governmental entity; | |
(c) | a company, if |
(i) | the principal class of its shares is listed on a recognised stock exchange specified in subparagraph a) or b) of paragraph 6 and is regularly traded on one or more recognised stock exchanges, or | |
(ii) | at least 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the shares in the company is owned directly or indirectly by five or fewer companies entitled to benefits under subdivision (i) of this subparagraph, provided that, in the case of indirect ownership, each intermediate owner is a resident of either Contracting State; |
(d) | a charity or other tax-exempt entity, provided that, in the case of a pension trust or any other organization that is established exclusively to provide pension or other similar benefits, more than 50 per cent of the person's beneficiaries, members or participants are individuals resident in either Contracting State; or | |
(e) | a person other than an individual, if: |
(i) | on at least half the days of the fiscal year persons that are qualified persons by reason of subparagraph a), b) or d) or subdivision c)(i) of this paragraph own, directly or indirectly, at least 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the shares or other beneficial interests in the person, and | |
(ii) | less than 50 per cent of the person's gross income for the taxable year is paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, to persons who are not residents of either Contracting State in the form of payments that are deductible for purposes of the taxes covered by this Convention in the person's State of residence (but not including arm's length payments in the ordinary course of business for services or tangible property and payments in respect of financial obligations to a bank, provided that where such a bank is not a resident of a Contracting State such payment is attributable to a permanent establishment of that bank located in one of the Contracting States). |
3. | (a) A resident of a Contracting State will be entitled to benefits of the Convention with respect to an item of income, derived from the other State, regardless of whether the resident is a qualified person, if the resident is actively carrying on business in the first-mentioned State (other than the business of making or managing investments for the resident's own account, unless these activities are banking, insurance or securities activities carried on by a bank, insurance company or registered securities dealer), the income derived from the other Contracting State is derived in connection with, or is incidental to, that business and that resident satisfies the other conditions of this Convention for the obtaining of such benefits. | |
(b) | If the resident or any of its associated enterprises carries on a business activity in the other Contracting State which gives rise to an item of income, subparagraph a) shall apply to such item only if the business activity in the first-mentioned State is substantial in relation to business carried on in the other State. Whether a business activity is substantial for purposes of this paragraph will be determined based on all the facts and circumstances. | |
(c) | In determining whether a person is actively carrying on business in a Contracting State under subparagraph a), activities conducted by a partnership in which that person is a partner and activities conducted by persons connected to such person shall be deemed to be conducted by such person. A person shall be connected to another if one possesses at least 50 per cent of the beneficial interest in the other (or, in the case of a company, at least 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company's shares) or another person possesses, directly or indirectly, at least 50 per cent of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of a company, at least 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company's shares) in each person. In any case, a person shall be considered to be connected to another if, based on all the facts and circumstances, one has control of the other or both are under the control of the same person or persons. | |
4. | Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Article, if a company that is a resident of a Contracting State, or a company that controls such a company, has outstanding a class of shares |
(a) | which is subject to terms or other arrangements which entitle its holders to a portion of the income of the company derived from the other Contracting State that is larger than the portion such holders would receive absent such terms or arrangements ("the disproportionate part of the income"); and | |
(b) | 50 per cent or more of the voting power and value of which is owned by persons who are not qualified persons |
the benefits of this Convention shall not apply to the disproportionate part of the income. | ||
5. | A resident of a Contracting State that is neither a qualified person pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 or entitled to benefits under paragraph 3 or 4 shall, nevertheless, be granted benefits of the Convention if the competent authority of that other Contracting State determines that the establishment, acquisition or maintenance of such person and the conduct of its operations did not have as one of its principal purposes the obtaining of benefits under the Convention. | |
6. | For the purposes of this Article the term "recognised stock exchange" means: |
(a) | in State A ……..; | |
(b) | in State B ……..; and | |
(c) | any other stock exchange which the competent authorities agree to recognise for the purposes of this Article." |
Paragraph 20 was replaced on 28 January 2003 when paragraph 20 was renumbered as paragraph 18 (see history of paragraph 18) and a new paragraph 20 was added by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 21: Replaced on 21 November 2017 when paragraph 21 and the heading preceding it were deleted and a new paragraph 21 was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 21 read as follows:
"Provisions which are aimed at entities benefiting from preferential tax regimes
21. Specific types of companies enjoying tax privileges in their State of residence facilitate conduit arrangements and raise the issue of harmful tax practices. Where tax-exempt (or nearly tax-exempt) companies may be distinguished by special legal characteristics, the improper use of tax treaties may be avoided by denying the tax treaty benefits to these companies (the exclusion approach). As such privileges are granted mostly to specific types of companies as defined in the commercial law or in the tax law of a country, the most radical solution would be to exclude such companies from the scope of the treaty. Another solution would be to insert a safeguarding clause which would apply to the income received or paid by such companies and which could be drafted along the following lines:
No provision of the Convention conferring an exemption from, or reduction of, tax shall apply to income received or paid by a company as defined under section ... of the ... Act, or under any similar provision enacted by ... after the signature of the Convention.
The scope of this provision could be limited by referring only to specific types of income, such as dividends, interest, capital gains, or directors' fees. Under such provisions companies of the type concerned would remain entitled to the protection offered under Article 24 (Non-Discrimination) and to the benefits of Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure) and they would be subject to the provisions of Article 26 (Exchange of Information)."
Paragraph 21 as it read after 28 January 2003 corresponded to previous paragraph 15. On that date paragraph 21 was renumbered as paragraph 19 (see history of paragraph 19), paragraph 15 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 21 and the heading preceding paragraph 21 was added by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002). After 23 October 1997 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 15 read as follows:
"15. Conduit situations can be created by the use of tax-exempt (or nearly tax-exempt) companies that may be distinguished by special legal characteristics. The improper use of tax treaties may then be avoided by denying the tax treaty benefits to these companies (the exclusion approach). The main cases are specific types of companies enjoying tax privileges in their State of residence giving them in fact a status similar to that of a non-resident. As such privileges are granted mostly to specific types of companies as defined in the commercial law or in the tax law of a country, the most radical solution would be to exclude such companies from the scope of the treaty. Another solution would be to insert a safeguarding clause such as the following:
"No provision of the Convention conferring an exemption from, or reduction of, tax shall apply to income received or paid by a company as defined under Section ... of the ... Act, or under any similar provision enacted by ... after the signature of the Convention."
The scope of this provision could be limited by referring only to specific types of income, such as dividends, interest, capital gains, or directors' fees. Under such provisions companies of the type concerned would remain entitled to the protection offered under Article 24 (non-discrimination) and to the benefits of Article 25 (mutual agreement procedure) and they would be subject to the provisions of Article 26 (exchange of information)."
Paragraph 15 was previously amended on 23 October 1997, by deleting the words "as far as the income paid by the company is concerned" in the first line of the last part of the paragraph, by the report entitled "The 1997 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 October 1997. After 21 September 1995 and until 23 October 1997, paragraph 15 read as follows:
"15. Conduit situations can be created by the use of tax-exempt (or nearly tax-exempt) companies that may be distinguished by special legal characteristics. The improper use of tax treaties may then be avoided by denying the tax treaty benefits to these companies (the exclusion approach). The main cases are specific types of companies enjoying tax privileges in their State of residence giving them in fact a status similar to that of a non-resident. As such privileges are granted mostly to specific types of companies as defined in the commercial law or in the tax law of a country, the most radical solution would be to exclude such companies from the scope of the treaty. Another solution would be to insert a safeguarding clause such as the following:
"No provision of the Convention conferring an exemption from, or reduction of, tax shall apply to income received or paid by a company as defined under Section ... of the ... Act, or under any similar provision enacted by ... after the signature of the Convention."
The scope of this provision, as far as the income paid by the company is concerned, could be limited by referring only to specific types of income, such as dividends, interest, capital gains, or directors' fees. Under such provisions companies of the type concerned would remain entitled to the protection offered under Article 24 (non-discrimination) and to the benefits of Article 25 (mutual agreement procedure) and they would be subject to the provisions of Article 26 (exchange of information)."
Paragraph 15 was previously amended on 21 September 1995, by replacing the word "which" with "that" in the first sentence, on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1.
Paragraph 15 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 26 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 21.1: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 21.1 read as follows:
"21.1 Exclusion provisions are clear and their application is simple, even though they may require administrative assistance in some instances. They are an important instrument by which a State that has created special privileges in its tax law may prevent those privileges from being used in connection with the improper use of tax treaties concluded by that State."
Paragraph 21.1 as it read after 28 January 2003 corresponded to previous paragraph 16. On that date paragraph 16 was renumbered as paragraph 21.1 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 16 was amended on 21 September 1995, by replacing the word "which" with "that" in the second sentence, when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1. After 23 July 1992 and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 16 read as follows:
"16. Exclusion provisions are clear and their application is simple, even though they may require administrative assistance in some instances. They are an important instrument by which a State which has created special privileges in its tax law may prevent those privileges from being used in connection with the improper use of tax treaties concluded by that State."
Paragraph 16 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 28 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 21.2: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 21.2 read as follows:
"21.2 Where it is not possible or appropriate to identify the companies enjoying tax privileges by reference to their special legal characteristics, a more general formulation will be necessary. The following provision aims at denying the benefits of the Convention to entities which would otherwise qualify as residents of a Contracting State but which enjoy, in that State, a preferential tax regime restricted to foreign-held entities (i.e. not available to entities that belong to residents of that State):
Any company, trust or partnership that is a resident of a Contracting State and is beneficially owned or controlled directly or indirectly by one or more persons who are not residents of that State shall not be entitled to the benefits of this Convention if the amount of the tax imposed on the income or capital of the company, trust or partnership by that State (after taking into account any reduction or offset of the amount of tax in any manner, including a refund, reimbursement, contribution, credit or allowance to the company, trust or partnership, or to any other person) is substantially lower than the amount that would be imposed by that State if all of the shares of the capital stock of the company or all of the interests in the trust or partnership, as the case may be, were beneficially owned by one or more residents of that State."
Paragraph 21.2 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 21.3: Deleted together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 21.3 and the heading that preceded it read as follows:
"Provisions which are aimed at particular types of income
21.3 The following provision aims at denying the benefits of the Convention with respect to income that is subject to low or no tax under a preferential tax regime:
1. | The benefits of this Convention shall not apply to income which may, in accordance with the other provisions of the Convention, be taxed in a Contracting State and which is derived from activities the performance of which do not require substantial presence in that State, including: |
(a) | such activities involving banking, shipping, financing, insurance or electronic commerce activities; or | |
(b) | activities involving headquarter or coordination centre or similar arrangements providing company or group administration, financing or other support; or | |
(c) | activities which give rise to passive income, such as dividends, interest and royalties |
where, under the laws or administrative practices of that State, such income is preferentially taxed and, in relation thereto, information is accorded confidential treatment that prevents the effective exchange of information. | ||
2. | For the purposes of paragraph 1, income is preferentially taxed in a Contracting State if, other than by reason of the preceding Articles of this Agreement, an item of income: |
(a) | is exempt from tax; or | |
(b) | is taxable in the hands of a taxpayer but that is subject to a rate of tax that is lower than the rate applicable to an equivalent item that is taxable in the hands of similar taxpayers who are residents of that State; or | |
(c) | benefits from a credit, rebate or other concession or benefit that is provided directly or indirectly in relation to that item of income, other than a credit for foreign tax paid." |
Paragraph 21.3 was added together with the heading preceding it on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 21.4: Deleted together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 21.4 and the heading that preceded it read as follows:
"Anti-abuse rules dealing with source taxation of specific types of income
21.4 The following provision has the effect of denying the benefits of specific Articles of the convention that restrict source taxation where transactions have been entered into for the main purpose of obtaining these benefits. The Articles concerned are 10, 11, 12 and 21; the provision should be slightly modified as indicated below to deal with the specific type of income covered by each of these Articles:
The provisions of this Article shall not apply if it was the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the creation or assignment of the [Article 10: "shares or other rights"; Article 11: "debt-claim"; Articles 12 and 21: "rights"] in respect of which the [Article 10: "dividend"; Article 11: "interest"; Articles 12 "royalties" and Article 21: "income"] is paid to take advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment."
Paragraph 21.4 was added with the heading preceding it on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 21.5: Deleted together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 21.5 and the heading that preceded it read as follows:
"Provisions which are aimed at preferential regimes introduced after the signature of the convention
21.5 States may wish to prevent abuses of their conventions involving provisions introduced by a Contracting State after the signature of the Convention. The following provision aims to protect a Contracting State from having to give treaty benefits with respect to income benefiting from a special regime for certain offshore income introduced after the signature of the treaty:
The benefits of Articles 6 to 22 of this Convention shall not accrue to persons entitled to any special tax benefit under:
(a) | a law of either one of the States which has been identified in an exchange of notes between the States; or | |
(b) | any substantially similar law subsequently enacted." |
Paragraph 21.5 was added together with the heading preceding it on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 22: Corresponds to paragraph 6.8 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 22 was deleted and paragraph 6.8 was renumbered as paragraph 22, by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. At the same time the heading preceding paragraph 6.8 was moved with it.
Paragraph 6.8 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 22, as it read before 21 November 2017, was deleted by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 22 read as follows:
"22. Other forms of abuse of tax treaties (e.g. the use of a base company) and possible ways to deal with them, including "substance-over-form", "economic substance" and general anti-abuse rules have also been analysed, particularly as concerns the question of whether these rules conflict with tax treaties, which is the second question mentioned in paragraph 9.1 above."
Paragraph 22 was amended on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003. After 23 July 1992 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 22 read as follows:
"22. Other forms of abuse of tax treaties (e.g. the use of a base company) and of possible ways to deal with them such as "substance-over-form" rules and "sub-part F type" provisions have also been analysed."
Paragraph 22 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992.
Paragraph 22.1: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 22.1 read as follows:
"22.1 Such rules are part of the basic domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability; these rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them. Thus, as a general rule and having regard to paragraph 9.5, there will be no conflict. For example, to the extent that the application of the rules referred to in paragraph 22 results in a recharacterisation of income or in a redetermination of the taxpayer who is considered to derive such income, the provisions of the Convention will be applied taking into account these changes."
Paragraph 22.1 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 22.2: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 22.2 read as follows:
"22.2 Whilst these rules do not conflict with tax conventions, there is agreement that member countries should carefully observe the specific obligations enshrined in tax treaties to relieve double taxation as long as there is no clear evidence that the treaties are being abused."
Paragraph 22.2 as it read after 28 January 2003 corresponded to previous paragraph 25. On that date paragraph 25 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 22.2 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003. After 21 September 1995 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 25 read as follows:
"25. While these and the other counteracting measures described in the reports mentioned in paragraph 11 above are not inconsistent with the spirit of tax treaties, there is agreement that member countries should carefully observe the specific obligations enshrined in tax treaties, as long as there is no clear evidence that the treaties are being improperly used. Furthermore, it seems desirable that counteracting measures comply with the spirit of tax treaties with a view to avoiding double taxation. Where the taxpayer complies with such counteracting measures, it might furthermore be appropriate to grant him the protection of the treaty network."
Paragraph 25 was previously amended on 21 September 1995, by replacing the words "it might be adequate to grant him" with "it might be appropriate to grant him" in the last sentence, when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1.
Paragraph 25 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 46 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 23: Corresponds to paragraph 6.9 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 23 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 81 (see history of paragraph 81) and paragraph 6.9 was renumbered as paragraph 23, by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.9 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 24: Corresponds to paragraph 6.10 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.10 renumbered as paragraph 24 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.10 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 24 as it read before 28 January 2003 was deleted by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003. After 21 September 1995 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 24 read as follows:
"24. It is not easy to reconcile these divergent opinions, either in theory or in mutual agreement procedures on specific cases. The main problem seems to be whether or not general principles such as "substance-over-form" are inherent in treaty provisions, i.e. whether they can be applied in any case, or only to the extent they are expressly mentioned in bilateral conventions. The dissenting view argues that to give domestic rules precedence over treaty rules as to who, for tax purposes, is regarded as the recipient of the income shifted to a base company, would erode the protection of taxpayers against double taxation (e.g. where by applying these rules, base company income is taxed in the country of the shareholders even though there is no permanent establishment of the base company there). However, it is the view of the wide majority that such rules, and the underlying principles, do not have to be confirmed in the text of the convention to be applicable."
Paragraph 24 was amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1.After 23 July 1992 and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 24 read as follows:
"24. It is not easy to reconcile these divergent opinions in theory, or in mutual agreement procedures on specific cases. The main problem seems to be whether or not general principles such as "substance-over-form" are inherent in treaty provisions, i.e. whether they can be applied in any case, or only to the extent they are expressly mentioned in bilateral conventions. On the dissenting view, it is argued that to give domestic rules precedence over treaty rules as to who, for tax purposes, is regarded as the recipient of the income shifted to a base company, would erode the protection of taxpayers against double taxation (e.g. where by applying these rules, base company income is taxed in the country of the shareholders even though there is no permanent establishment of the base company there). However, it is the view of the wide majority that such rules, and the underlying principles, do not have to be confirmed in the text of the convention to be applicable."
Paragraph 24 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 40 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 25: Corresponds to paragraph 6.11 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.11 was renumbered as paragraph 25 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.11 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 25 as it read before 28 January 2003 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 22.2 (see history of paragraph 22.2) by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 26: Corresponds to paragraph 6.12 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 26 was deleted and paragraph 6.12 was amended to change a cross-reference and renumbered as paragraph 26, by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 26 read as follows:
"26. By contrast, in other States, a CIV is in principle liable to tax but its income may be fully exempt, for instance, if the CIV fulfils certain criteria with regard to its purpose, activities or operation, which may include requirements as to minimum distributions, its sources of income and sometimes its sectors of operation. More frequently, CIVs are subject to tax but the base for taxation is reduced, in a variety of different ways, by reference to distributions paid to investors. Deductions for distributions will usually mean that no tax is in fact paid. Other States tax CIVs but at a special low tax rate. Finally, some States tax CIVs fully but with integration at the investor level to avoid double taxation of the income of the CIV. For those countries that adopt the view, reflected in paragraph 8.6 of the Commentary on Article 4, that a person may be liable to tax even if the State in which it is established does not impose tax, the CIV would be treated as a resident of the State in which it is established in all of these cases because the CIV is subject to comprehensive taxation in that State. Even in the case where the income of the CIV is taxed at a zero rate, or is exempt from tax, the requirements to be treated as a resident may be met if the requirements to qualify for such lower rate or exemption are sufficiently stringent."
Paragraph 6.12 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 26, as it read before 21 November 2017, was deleted by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 26 read as follows:
"26. States that adopt controlled foreign companies provisions or the anti-abuse rules referred to above in their domestic tax laws seek to maintain the equity and neutrality of these laws in an international environment characterised by very different tax burdens, but such measures should be used only for this purpose. As a general rule, these measures should not be applied where the relevant income has been subjected to taxation that is comparable to that in the country of residence of the taxpayer."
Paragraph 26 was replaced on 28 January 2003 when paragraph 26 was deleted and a new paragraph 26 was added by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003. After 21 September 1995 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 26 read as follows:
"26. The majority of member countries accept counteracting measures as a necessary means of maintaining equity and neutrality of national tax laws in an international environment characterised by very different tax burdens, but believe that such measures should be used only for this purpose. It would be contrary to the general principles underlying the Model Convention and to the spirit of tax treaties in general if counteracting measures were to be extended to activities such as production, normal rendering of services or trading of companies engaged in real industrial or commercial activity, when they are clearly related to the economic environment of the country where they are resident in a situation where these activities are carried out in such a way that no tax avoidance could be suspected. Counteracting measures should not be applied to countries in which taxation is comparable to that of the country of residence of the taxpayer."
Paragraph 26 was amended on 21 September 1995, by replacing the words "but such measures" with "but believe that such measures" in the first sentence, when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1.After 23 July 1992 and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 26 read as follows:
"26. The majority of member countries accept counteracting measures as a necessary means of maintaining equity and neutrality of national tax laws in an international environment characterised by very different tax burdens, but such measures should be used only for this purpose. It would be contrary to the general principles underlying the Model Convention and to the spirit of tax treaties in general if counteracting measures were to be extended to activities such as production, normal rendering of services or trading of companies engaged in real industrial or commercial activity, when they are clearly related to the economic environment of the country where they are resident in a situation where these activities are carried out in such a way that no tax avoidance could be suspected. Counteracting measures should not be applied to countries in which taxation is comparable to that of the country of residence of the taxpayer."
Paragraph 26 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 47 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 26.1: Renumbered as paragraph 108 (see history of paragraph 108) and amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. At the same time the heading preceding paragraph 26.1 was deleted. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 September 1995, the heading read as follows:
"Remittance based taxation"
Paragraph 26.2: Renumbered as paragraph 109 (see history of paragraph 109) and the preceding heading was moved with it on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 27: Corresponds to paragraph 6.13 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 27 was deleted and paragraph 6.13 was amended to change a cross-reference and renumbered as paragraph 27, by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. At the same time the heading that preceded paragraph 27 was moved immediately before paragraph 110. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27 read as follows:
"27. Those countries that adopt the alternative view, reflected in paragraph 8.7 of the Commentary on Article 4, that an entity that is exempt from tax therefore is not liable to tax may not view some or all of the CIVs described in the preceding paragraph as residents of the States in which they are established. States taking the latter view, and those States negotiating with such States, are encouraged to address the issue in their bilateral negotiations."
Paragraph 6.13 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 27, as it read before 21 November 2017, was deleted by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27 read as follows:
"27. Chile considers that some of the solutions put forward in the report "The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships" and incorporated in the Commentary can only be applied if expressly incorporated in a tax convention."
Paragraph 27 as it read before 21 November 2017 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010.
Paragraph 27 as it read before 28 January 2003 was deleted by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on
28 January 2003. After 23 July 1992 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 27 read as follows:
"27. The United States believes that the business activities referred to in subparagraph b) of paragraph 21 of the Commentary should exclude "the business of making or managing investments, unless these activities are banking or insurance activities carried on by a bank or insurance company." Absent this language, a third-country resident could set up a classic treaty shopping conduit operation — a personal investment company — and argue that the company is engaged in a substantive business operation (the managing of the third-country owner's personal portfolio) and the income in respect of which benefits are claimed (dividends and interest) is connected with those business operations."
Paragraph 27 was added with the heading preceding it on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992.
Paragraph 27.1: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27.1 read as follows:
"27.1 The Netherlands will adhere to the conclusions on the application of the Convention to partnerships incorporated in the Commentary on Article 1 and in the Commentaries on the other relevant provisions of the Convention only, and to the extent to which, it is explicitly so confirmed in a specific tax treaty, as a result of mutual agreement between competent authorities as meant in Article 25 of the Convention or as unilateral policy."
Paragraph 27.1 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on
29 April 2000.
Paragraph 27.2: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 17 July 2008 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27.2 read as follows:
"27.2 France has expressed a number of reservations on the report on "The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships". In particular, France does not agree with the interpretation put forward in paragraphs 5 and 6 above according to which if a partnership is denied the benefits of a tax convention, its members are always entitled to the benefits of the tax conventions entered into by their State of residence. France believes that this result is only possible, when France is the State of source, if its internal law authorises that interpretation or if provisions to that effect are included in the convention entered into with the State of residence of the partners."
Paragraph 27.2 was amended on 17 July 2008 by the report entitled "The 2008 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 17 July 2008. After 28 January 2003 and until 17 July 2008, paragraph 27.2 read as follows:
"27.2 France has expressed a number of reservations on the report on "The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships". In particular, France does not agree with the interpretation put forward in paragraphs 5 and 6 above according to which if a partnership is denied the benefits of a tax convention, its members are entitled to the benefits of the tax conventions entered into by their State of residence. France believes that this result is only possible, to a certain extent, if provisions to that effect are included in the convention entered into with the State where the partnership is situated. This view is also shared by Mexico."
Paragraph 27.2 was previously amended on 28 January 2003, by adding Mexico as a country making the observation, by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003. After 29 April 2000 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 27.2 read as follows:
"27.2 France has expressed a number of reservations on the report on "The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships". In particular, France does not agree with the interpretation put forward in paragraphs 5 and 6 above according to which if a partnership is denied the benefits of a tax convention, its members are entitled to the benefits of the tax conventions entered into by their State of residence. France believes that this result is only possible, to a certain extent, if provisions to that effect are included in the convention entered into with the State where the partnership is situated."
Paragraph 27.2 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000.
Paragraph 27.3: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 29 April 2000 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27.3 read as follows:
"27.3 Portugal, where all partnerships are taxed as such, has expressed a number of reservations on the report on "The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships" and considers that the solutions put forward in that report should be incorporated in special provisions only applicable when included in tax conventions. This is the case, for example, of the treatment of the situation of partners of partnerships — a concept which is considerably fluid given the differences between States — that are fiscally transparent, including the situation where a third State is inserted between the State of source and the State of residence of the partners. The administrative difficulties resulting from some of the solutions put forward should also be noted, as indicated in the report itself in certain cases."
Paragraph 27.3 was added on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 29 April 2000.
Paragraph 27.4: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27.4 read as follows:
"27.4 Belgium cannot share the views expressed in paragraph 23 of the Commentary. Belgium considers that the application of controlled foreign companies legislation is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 7 of Article 5, paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10 of the Convention. This is especially the case where a Contracting State taxes one of its residents on income derived by a foreign entity by using a fiction attributing to that resident, in proportion to his participation in the capital of the foreign entity, the income derived by that entity. By doing so, that State increases the tax base of its resident by including in it income which has not been derived by that resident but by a foreign entity which is not taxable in that State in accordance with the Convention. That Contracting State thus disregards the legal personality of the foreign entity and therefore acts contrary to the Convention (see also paragraph 79 of the Commentary on Article 7 and paragraph 68.1 of the Commentary on Article 10)."
Paragraph 27.4 was amended on 22 July 2010, by replacing the cross-reference to "paragraph 66 of the Commentary on Article 7" with "paragraph 74 of the Commentary on Article 7", by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010. After 17 July 2008 and until 22 July 2010, paragraph 27.4 read as follows:
"27.4 Belgium cannot share the views expressed in paragraph 23 of the Commentary. Belgium considers that the application of controlled foreign companies legislation is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 7 of Article 5, paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10 of the Convention. This is especially the case where a Contracting State taxes one of its residents on income derived by a foreign entity by using a fiction attributing to that resident, in proportion to his participation in the capital of the foreign entity, the income derived by that entity. By doing so, that State increases the tax base of its resident by including in it income which has not been derived by that resident but by a foreign entity which is not taxable in that State in accordance with the Convention. That Contracting State thus disregards the legal personality of the foreign entity and therefore acts contrary to the Convention (see also paragraph 66 of the Commentary on Article 7 and paragraph 68.1 of the Commentary on Article 10)"
Paragraph 27.4 was previously amended on 17 July 2008, by replacing the cross-reference to "paragraph 40.1 of the Commentary on Article 7" with "paragraph 66 of the Commentary on Article 7", by the report entitled "The 2008 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 17 July 2008. After 28 January 2003 and until 17 July 2008, paragraph 27.4 read as follows:
"27.4 Belgium cannot share the views expressed in paragraph 23 of the Commentary. Belgium considers that the application of controlled foreign companies legislation is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 7 of Article 5, paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10 of the Convention. This is especially the case where a Contracting State taxes one of its residents on income derived by a foreign entity by using a fiction attributing to that resident, in proportion to his participation in the capital of the foreign entity, the income derived by that entity. By doing so, that State increases the tax base of its resident by including in it income which has not been derived by that resident but by a foreign entity which is not taxable in that State in accordance with the Convention. That Contracting State thus disregards the legal personality of the foreign entity and therefore acts contrary to the Convention (see also paragraph 40.1 of the Commentary on Article 7 and paragraph 68.1 of the Commentary on Article 10)."
Paragraph 27.4 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 27.5: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27.5 read as follows:
"27.5 Concerning potential conflicts between anti-abuse provisions (including controlled foreign company — CFC — provisions) in domestic law and the provisions of tax treaties, Ireland considers that it is not possible to have a simple general conclusion that no conflict will exist or that any conflict must be resolved in favour of the domestic law. This will depend on the nature of the domestic law provision and also on the legal and constitutional relationship in individual member countries between domestic law and international agreements and law. Also, Ireland does not agree with the deletion of the language in paragraph 26 (as it read until 2002), which stated: "It would be contrary to the general principles underlying the Model Convention and to the spirit of tax treaties in general if counteracting measures were to be extended to activities such as production, normal rendering of services or trading of companies engaged in real industrial or commercial activity, when they are clearly related to the economic environment of the country where they are resident in a situation where these activities are carried out in such a way that no tax avoidance could be suspected"."
Paragraph 27.5 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 27.6: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27.6 read as follows:
"27.6 Luxembourg does not share the interpretation in paragraphs 9.2, 22.1 and 23 which provide that there is generally no conflict between anti-abuse provisions of the domestic law of a Contracting State and the provisions of its tax conventions. Absent an express provision in the Convention, Luxembourg therefore believes that a State can only apply its domestic anti-abuse provisions in specific cases after recourse to the mutual agreement procedure."
Paragraph 27.6 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 27.7: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27.7 read as follows:
"27.7 The Netherlands does not adhere to the statements in the Commentaries that as a general rule domestic anti-avoidance rules and controlled foreign companies provisions do not conflict with the provisions of tax conventions. The compatibility of such rules and provisions with tax treaties is, among other things, dependent on the nature and wording of the specific provision, the wording and purpose of the relevant treaty provision and the relationship between domestic and international law in a country. Since tax conventions are not meant to facilitate the improper use thereof, the application of national rules and provisions may be justified in specific cases of abuse or clearly unintended use. In such situations the application of domestic measures has to respect the principle of proportionality and should not go beyond what is necessary to prevent the abuse or the clearly unintended use."
Paragraph 27.7 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 27.8: Deleted on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010. After 28 January 2003 and until 22 July 2010, paragraph 27.8 read as follows:
"27.8 Whenever the prevailing hierarchy of tax conventions regarding internal law is not respected, Portugal will not adhere to the conclusions on the clarification of domestic anti-abuse rules incorporated in the Commentary on Article 1."
Paragraph 27.8 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 27.9: Renumbered as paragraph 110 (see history of paragraph 110) and amended on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 27.10: Deleted on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 17 July 2008 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27.10 read as follows:
"27.10 Mexico does not agree with the interpretation put forward in paragraphs 5 and 6 above according to which if a partnership is denied the benefits of a tax convention, its members are entitled to the benefits of the tax conventions entered into by their State of residence. Mexico believes that this result is only possible, to a certain extent, if provisions to that effect are included in the convention entered into with the State where the partnership is situated."
Paragraph 27.10 was added on 17 July 2008 by the report entitled "The 2008 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 17 July 2008.
Paragraph 28: Corresponds to paragraph 6.14 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 28 was renumbered as paragraph 111 (see history of paragraph 111), the preceding heading was moved with it and paragraph 6.14 was renumbered as paragraph 28, by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.14 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 29: Corresponds to paragraph 6.15 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.15 was renumbered as paragraph 29 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.15 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 29 as it read before 31 March 1994 was deleted by the report entitled "1994 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 31 March 1994. After 23 July 1992 and until 31 March 1994, paragraph 29 read as follows:
"29. The United States reserves the right to limit the benefits of the Convention to certain persons."
Paragraph 29 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992.
Paragraph 30: Corresponds to paragraph 6.16 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.16 was renumbered as paragraph 30 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.16 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 31: Corresponds to paragraph 6.17 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.17 was renumbered as paragraph 31 and the preceding heading was moved with it by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.17 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 32: Corresponds to paragraph 6.18 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.18 was renumbered as paragraph 32 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.18 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 33: Corresponds to paragraph 6.19 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.19 was renumbered as paragraph 33 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.19 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 34: Corresponds to paragraph 6.20 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.20 was renumbered as paragraph 34 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.20 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 35: Corresponds to paragraph 6.21 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.21 was amended, to update cross-references, and renumbered as paragraph 35 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. At that time, the heading preceding paragraph 6.21 was moved with it. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.21 read as follows:
"6.21 Where the Contracting States have agreed that a specific provision dealing with CIVs is necessary to address the concerns described in paragraphs 6.18 through 6.20, they could include in the bilateral treaty the following provision:
(a) | Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a collective investment vehicle which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall be treated for purposes of applying the Convention to such income as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof), but only to the extent that the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle are owned by equivalent beneficiaries. | |
(b) | For purposes of this paragraph: |
(i) | the term "collective investment vehicle" means, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to regard as a collective investment vehicle for purposes of this paragraph; and | |
(ii) | the term "equivalent beneficiary" means a resident of the Contracting State in which the CIV is established, and a resident of any other State with which the Contracting State in which the income arises has an income tax convention that provides for effective and comprehensive information exchange who would, if he received the particular item of income for which benefits are being claimed under this Convention, be entitled under that convention, or under the domestic law of the Contracting State in which the income arises, to a rate of tax with respect to that item of income that is at least as low as the rate claimed under this Convention by the CIV with respect to that item of income." |
Paragraph 6.21 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 36: Corresponds to paragraph 6.22 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.22 was renumbered as paragraph 36 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.22 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 37: Corresponds to paragraph 6.23 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.23 was renumbered as paragraph 37 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.23 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 38: Corresponds to paragraph 6.24 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.24 was renumbered as paragraph 38 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.24 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 39: Corresponds to paragraph 6.25 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.25 was renumbered as paragraph 39 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 39 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 40: Corresponds to paragraph 6.26 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.26 was renumbered as paragraph 40 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.26 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 41: Corresponds to paragraph 6.27 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.27 was amended, to update cross-references, and renumbered as paragraph 41 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.27 read as follows:
"6.27 Although the purely proportionate approach set out in paragraphs 6.21 and 6.26 protects against treaty shopping, it may also impose substantial administrative burdens as a CIV attempts to determine the treaty entitlement of every single investor. A Contracting State may decide that the fact that a substantial proportion of the CIV's investors are treaty-eligible is adequate protection against treaty shopping, and thus that it is appropriate to provide an ownership threshold above which benefits would be provided with respect to all income received by the CIV. Including such a threshold would also mitigate some of the procedural burdens that otherwise might arise. If desired, therefore, the following sentence could be added at the end of subparagraph a):
However, if at least [ ] per cent of the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle are owned by [equivalent beneficiaries][residents of the Contracting State in which the collective investment vehicle is established], the collective investment vehicle shall be treated as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of all of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof)."
Paragraph 6.27 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 42: Corresponds to paragraph 6.28 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.28 was amended, to update cross-references, and renumbered as paragraph 42 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.28 read as follows:
"6.28 In some cases, the Contracting States might wish to take a different approach from that put forward in paragraphs 6.17, 6.21 and 6.26 with respect to certain types of CIVs and to treat the CIV as making claims on behalf of the investors rather than in its own name. This might be true, for example, if a large percentage of the owners of interests in the CIV as a whole, or of a class of interests in the CIV, are pension funds that are exempt from tax in the source country under terms of the relevant treaty similar to those described in paragraph 69 of the Commentary on Article 18. To ensure that the investors would not lose the benefit of the preferential rates to which they would have been entitled had they invested directly, the Contracting States might agree to a provision along the following lines with respect to such CIVs (although likely adopting one of the approaches of paragraph 6.17, 6.21 or 6.26 with respect to other types of CIVs):
(a) | A collective investment vehicle described in subparagraph c) which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall not be treated as a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established, but may claim, on behalf of the owners of the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle, the tax reductions, exemptions or other benefits that would have been available under this Convention to such owners had they received such income directly. | |
(b) | A collective investment vehicle may not make a claim under subparagraph a) for benefits on behalf of any owner of the beneficial interests in such collective investment vehicle if the owner has itself made an individual claim for benefits with respect to income received by the collective investment vehicle. | |
(c) | This paragraph shall apply with respect to, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State to which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to apply this paragraph. |
This provision would, however, limit the CIV to making claims on behalf of residents of the same Contracting State in which the CIV is established. If, for the reasons described in paragraph 6.23, the Contracting States deemed it desirable to allow the CIV to make claims on behalf of treaty-eligible residents of third States, that could be accomplished by replacing the words "this Convention" with "any Convention to which the other Contracting State is a party" in subparagraph a). If, as anticipated, the Contracting States would agree that the treatment provided in this paragraph would apply only to specific types of CIVs, it would be necessary to ensure that the types of CIVs listed in subparagraph c) did not include any of the types of CIVs listed in a more general provision such as that in paragraph 6.17, 6.21 or 6.26 so that the treatment of a specific type of CIV would be fixed, rather than elective. Countries wishing to allow individual CIVs to elect their treatment, either with respect to the CIV as a whole or with respect to one or more classes of interests in the CIV, are free to modify the paragraph to do so."
Paragraph 6.28 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 43: Corresponds to paragraph 6.29 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.29 was amended, to update cross-references, and renumbered as paragraph 43 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.29 read as follows:
"6.29 Under either the approach in paragraphs 6.21 and 6.26 or in paragraph 6.28, it will be necessary for the CIV to make a determination regarding the proportion of holders of interests who would have been entitled to benefits had they invested directly. Because ownership of interests in CIVs changes regularly, and such interests frequently are held through intermediaries, the CIV and its managers often do not themselves know the names and treaty status of the beneficial owners of interests. It would be impractical for the CIV to collect such information from the relevant intermediaries on a daily basis. Accordingly, Contracting States should be willing to accept practical and reliable approaches that do not require such daily tracing."
Paragraph 6.29 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 44: Corresponds to paragraph 6.30 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.30 was renumbered as paragraph 44 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.30 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 45: Corresponds to paragraph 6.31 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.31 was renumbered as paragraph 45 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.31 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 46: Corresponds to paragraph 6.32 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.32 was renumbered as paragraph 46 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.32 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 47: Corresponds to paragraph 6.33 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.33 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 47 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 6.33 read as follows:
"6.33 Each of the provisions in paragraphs 6.17, 6.21, 6.26 and 6.32 treats the CIV as the resident and the beneficial owner of the income it receives for the purposes of the application of the Convention to such income, which has the simplicity of providing for one reduced rate of withholding with respect to each type of income. These provisions should not be construed, however, as restricting in any way the right of the State of source from taxing its own residents who are investors in the CIV. Clearly, these provisions are intended to deal with the source taxation of the CIV's income and not the residence taxation of its investors (this conclusion is analogous to the one put forward in paragraph 6.1 above as regards partnerships). States that wish to confirm this point in the text of the provisions are free to amend the provisions accordingly, which could be done by adding the following sentence: "This provision shall not be construed as restricting in any way a Contracting State's right to tax the residents of that State"."
Paragraph 6.33 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 48: Corresponds to paragraph 6.34 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.34 was renumbered as paragraph 48 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.34 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010, on the basis of another report entitled "The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 April 2010).
Paragraph 49: Corresponds to paragraph 6.35 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.35 was renumbered as paragraph 49 and the preceding heading was moved with it by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.35 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010.
Paragraph 50: Corresponds to paragraph 6.36 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.36 was renumbered as paragraph 50 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.36 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010.
Paragraph 51: Corresponds to paragraph 6.37 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.37 was renumbered as paragraph 51 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.37 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010.
Paragraph 52: Corresponds to paragraph 6.38 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.38 was renumbered as paragraph 52 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.38 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010.
Paragraph 53: Corresponds to paragraph 6.39 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 6.39 was renumbered as paragraph 53 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 6.39 was added on 22 July 2010 by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010.
Paragraph 54: Corresponds to paragraph 7 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 7 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 54 and the preceding heading was moved with it by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 7 read as follows:
"7. The principal purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international double taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons. It is also a purpose of tax conventions to prevent tax avoidance and evasion."
Paragraph 7 was previously amended on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003. After 21 September 1995 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 7 read as follows:
"7. The purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international double taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons; they should not, however, help tax avoidance or evasion. True, taxpayers have the possibility, irrespective of double taxation conventions, to exploit differences in tax levels between States and the tax advantages provided by various countries' taxation laws, but it is for the States concerned to adopt provisions in their domestic laws to counter such manoeuvres. Such States will then wish, in their bilateral double taxation conventions, to preserve the application of provisions of this kind contained in their domestic laws."
Paragraph 7 was previously amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1. In the 1977 Model Convention and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 7 read as follows:
"7. The purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international double taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons; they should not, however, help tax avoidance or evasion. True, taxpayers have the possibility, double taxation conventions being left aside, to exploit differences in tax levels between States and the tax advantages provided by various countries' taxation laws, but it is for the States concerned to adopt provisions in their domestic laws to counter such manoeuvres. Such States will then wish, in their bilateral double taxation conventions, to preserve the application of provisions of this kind contained in their domestic laws."
Paragraph 7 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 55: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 56: Corresponds to paragraph 9 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 9 was renumbered as paragraph 56 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 9 was amended on 28 January 2003, by changing the cross-reference to "paragraph 4 of Article 13", in the last sentence, to "paragraph 5 of Article 13", by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003. After 21 September 1995 and until January 2003, paragraph 9 read as follows:
"9. This would be the case, for example, if a person (whether or not a resident of a Contracting State), acts through a legal entity created in a State essentially to obtain treaty benefits that would not be available directly. Another case would be an individual who has in a Contracting State both his permanent home and all his economic interests, including a substantial shareholding in a company of that State, and who, essentially in order to sell the shares and escape taxation in that State on the capital gains from the alienation (by virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 13), transfers his permanent home to the other Contracting State, where such gains are subject to little or no tax."
Paragraph 9 was previously amended on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1. In the 1977 Model Convention and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 9 read as follows:
"9. This would be the case, for example, if a person (whether or not a resident of a Contracting State), acts through a legal entity created in a State essentially to obtain treaty benefits that would not be available directly to such person. Another case would be one of an individual having in a Contracting State both his permanent home and all his economic interests, including a substantial participation in a company of that State, and who, essentially in order to sell the participation and escape taxation in that State on the capital gains from the alienation (by virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 13), transfers his permanent home to the other Contracting State, where such gains are subject to little or no tax."
Paragraph 9 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 57: Added together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 -Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 58: Corresponds to paragraph 9.2 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 9.2 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 58 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 9.2 read as follows:
"9.2 For many States, the answer to the first question is based on their answer to the second question. These States take account of the fact that taxes are ultimately imposed through the provisions of domestic law, as restricted (and in some rare cases, broadened) by the provisions of tax conventions. Thus, any abuse of the provisions of a tax convention could also be characterised as an abuse of the provisions of domestic law under which tax will be levied. For these States, the issue then becomes whether the provisions of tax conventions may prevent the application of the anti-abuse provisions of domestic law, which is the second question above. As indicated in paragraph 22.1 below, the answer to that second question is that to the extent these anti-avoidance rules are part of the basic domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability, they are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them. Thus, as a general rule, there will be no conflict between such rules and the provisions of tax conventions."
Paragraph 9.2 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 59: Corresponds to paragraph 9.3 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 9.3 was renumbered as paragraph 59 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 9.3 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 60: Corresponds to paragraph 9.4 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 9.4 was renumbered as paragraph 60 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 9.4 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 61: Corresponds to paragraph 9.5 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 9.5 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 61 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 9.5 read as follows:
"9.5 It is important to note, however, that it should not be lightly assumed that a taxpayer is entering into the type of abusive transactions referred to above. A guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation convention should not be available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements was to secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions."
Paragraph 9.5 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 62: Corresponds to paragraph 9.6 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 9.6 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 62 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 9.6 read as follows:
"9.6 The potential application of general anti-abuse provisions does not mean that there is no need for the inclusion, in tax conventions, of specific provisions aimed at preventing particular forms of tax avoidance. Where specific avoidance techniques have been identified or where the use of such techniques is especially problematic, it will often be useful to add to the Convention provisions that focus directly on the relevant avoidance strategy. Also, this will be necessary where a State which adopts the view described in paragraph 9.2 above believes that its domestic law lacks the anti-avoidance rules or principles necessary to properly address such strategy."
Paragraph 9.6 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 63: Corresponds to paragraph 10 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 10 was renumbered as paragraph 63 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 10 was amended on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002). In the 1977 Model Convention and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 10 read as follows:
"10. Some of these situations are dealt with in the Convention, e.g. by the introduction of the concept of "beneficial owner" (in Articles 10, 11 and 12) and of special provisions, for so-called artiste-companies (paragraph 2 of Article 17). Such problems are also mentioned in the Commentaries on Article 10 (paragraphs 17 and 22), Article 11 (paragraph 12), and Article 12 (paragraph 7). It may be appropriate for Contracting States to agree in bilateral negotiations that any relief from tax should not apply in certain cases, or to agree that the application of the provisions of domestic laws against tax avoidance should not be affected by the Convention."
Paragraph 10 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 64: Corresponds to paragraph 10.1 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 10.1 was renumbered as paragraph 64 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 10.1 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 65: Corresponds to paragraph 10.2 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 10.2 was renumbered as paragraph 65 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 10.2 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003, on the basis of another report entitled "Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits" (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002).
Paragraph 66: Added together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 -Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 67: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 68: Added together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 -Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 69: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 70: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 71: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 72: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 73: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 74: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 75: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 76: Added together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 -Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 77: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 78: Added together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 -Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 79: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 80: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 81: Corresponds to paragraph 23 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 23 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 81 and the preceding heading was added by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, on the basis of another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015. After 22 July 2010 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 23 read as follows:
"23. The use of base companies may also be addressed through controlled foreign companies provisions. A significant number of member and non-member countries have now adopted such legislation. Whilst the design of this type of legislation varies considerably among countries, a common feature of these rules, which are now internationally recognised as a legitimate instrument to protect the domestic tax base, is that they result in a Contracting State taxing its residents on income attributable to their participation in certain foreign entities. It has sometimes been argued, based on a certain interpretation of provisions of the Convention such as paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10, that this common feature of controlled foreign companies legislation conflicted with these provisions. For the reasons explained in paragraphs 14 of the Commentary on Article 7 and 37 of the Commentary on Article 10, that interpretation does not accord with the text of the provisions. It also does not hold when these provisions are read in their context. Thus, whilst some countries have felt it useful to expressly clarify, in their conventions, that controlled foreign companies legislation did not conflict with the Convention, such clarification is not necessary. It is recognised that controlled foreign companies legislation structured in this way is not contrary to the provisions of the Convention."
Paragraph 23 was previously amended on 22 July 2010, by replacing the cross-reference to paragraph "13 of the Commentary on Article 7" with "14 of the Commentary on Article 7", by the report entitled "The 2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 22 July 2010. After 17 July 2008 and until 22 July 2010, paragraph 23 read as follows:
"23. The use of base companies may also be addressed through controlled foreign companies provisions. A significant number of Member and non-member countries have now adopted such legislation. Whilst the design of this type of legislation varies considerably among countries, a common feature of these rules, which are now internationally recognised as a legitimate instrument to protect the domestic tax base, is that they result in a Contracting State taxing its residents on income attributable to their participation in certain foreign entities. It has sometimes been argued, based on a certain interpretation of provisions of the Convention such as paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10, that this common feature of controlled foreign companies legislation conflicted with these provisions. For the reasons explained in paragraphs 13 of the Commentary on Article 7 and 37 of the Commentary on Article 10, that interpretation does not accord with the text of the provisions. It also does not hold when these provisions are read in their context. Thus, whilst some countries have felt it useful to expressly clarify, in their conventions, that controlled foreign companies legislation did not conflict with the Convention, such clarification is not necessary. It is recognised that controlled foreign companies legislation structured in this way is not contrary to the provisions of the Convention."
Paragraph 23 was previously amended on 17 July 2008, by replacing the cross-reference to paragraph "10.1 of the Commentary on Article 7" with "13 of the Commentary on Article 7", by the report entitled "The 2008 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 17 July 2008. After 28 January 2003 and until 17 July 2008, paragraph 23 read as follows:
"23. The use of base companies may also be addressed through controlled foreign companies provisions. A significant number of Member and non-member countries have now adopted such legislation. Whilst the design of this type of legislation varies considerably among countries, a common feature of these rules, which are now internationally recognised as a legitimate instrument to protect the domestic tax base, is that they result in a Contracting State taxing its residents on income attributable to their participation in certain foreign entities. It has sometimes been argued, based on a certain interpretation of provisions of the Convention such as paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10, that this common feature of controlled foreign companies legislation conflicted with these provisions. For the reasons explained in paragraphs 13 of the Commentary on Article 7 and 37 of the Commentary on Article 10, that interpretation does not accord with the text of the provisions. It also does not hold when these provisions are read in their context. Thus, whilst some countries have felt it useful to expressly clarify, in their conventions, that controlled foreign companies legislation did not conflict with the Convention, such clarification is not necessary. It is recognised that controlled foreign companies legislation structured in this way is not contrary to the provisions of the Convention."
Paragraph 23 was replaced on 28 January 2003 when it when it was deleted and a new paragraph 23 was added by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003. After 21 September 1995 and until 28 January 2003, paragraph 23 read as follows:
"23. The large majority of OECD member countries consider that such measures are part of the basic domestic rules set by national tax law for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability. These rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them. One could invoke the spirit of the Convention, which would be violated only if a company, which is a person within the meaning of the Convention, ended up with no or almost no activity or income being attributed to it, and the Contracting States took divergent views on the subject, with economic double taxation resulting therefrom, the same income being taxed twice in the hands of two different taxpayers (see paragraph 2 of Article 9). A dissenting view, on the other hand, holds that such rules are subject to the general provisions of tax treaties against double taxation, especially where the treaty itself contains provisions aimed at counteracting its improper use."
Paragraph 23 was amended on 21 September 1995, by replacing the words "almost no activity and/or income" with "almost no activity or income" in the third sentence, on 21 September 1995 when a number of minor drafting changes that did not affect the meaning of the text were made to the Commentary on Article 1.After 23 July 1992 and until 21 September 1995, paragraph 23 read as follows:
"23. The large majority of OECD member countries consider that such measures are part of the basic domestic rules set by national tax law for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability. These rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them. One could invoke the spirit of the Convention, which would be violated only if a company, which is a person within the meaning of the Convention, ended up with no or almost no activity and/or income being attributed to it, and the Contracting States took divergent views on the subject, with economic double taxation resulting therefrom, the same income being taxed twice in the hands of two different taxpayers (see paragraph 2 of Article 9). A dissenting view, on the other hand, holds that such rules are subject to the general provisions of tax treaties against double taxation, especially where the treaty itself contains provisions aimed at counteracting its improper use."
Paragraph 23 was added on 23 July 1992 by the report entitled "The Revision of the Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992, on the basis of paragraph 39 of a previous report entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies" (adopted by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986).
Paragraph 82: Added together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 83: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 84: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 85: Added together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 86: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 87: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 88: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 89: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 90: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 91: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 92: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 93: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 94: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 95: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 96: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 97: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 98: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 99: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 100: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 101: Added together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 102: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 103: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 104: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 105: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 106: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 107: Added together with the preceding heading on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017, as a result of follow-up work on another report entitled "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - Final Report", endorsed by the G20 at the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit on 15-16 November 2015.
Paragraph 108: Corresponds to paragraph 26.1 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 26.1 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 108 and the preceding heading was amended and moved with it by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After 28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 26.1 and the heading that preceded it read as follows:
"Remittance based taxation
26.1 Under the domestic law of some States, persons who qualify as residents but who do not have what is considered to be a permanent link with the State (sometimes referred to as domicile) are only taxed on income derived from sources outside the State to the extent that this income is effectively repatriated, or remitted, thereto. Such persons are not, therefore, subject to potential double taxation to the extent that foreign income is not remitted to their State of residence and it may be considered inappropriate to give them the benefit of the provisions of the Convention on such income. Contracting States which agree to restrict the application of the provisions of the Convention to income that is effectively taxed in the hands of these persons may do so by adding the following provision to the Convention:
Where under any provision of this Convention income arising in a Contracting State is relieved in whole or in part from tax in that State and under the law in force in the other Contracting State a person, in respect of the said income, is subject to tax by reference to the amount thereof which is remitted to or received in that other State and not by reference to the full amount thereof, then any relief provided by the provisions of this Convention shall apply only to so much of the income as is taxed in the other Contracting State.
In some States, the application of that provision could create administrative difficulties if a substantial amount of time elapsed between the time the income arose in a Contracting State and the time it were taxed by the other Contracting State in the hands of a resident of that other State. States concerned by these difficulties could subject the rule in the last part of the above provision, i.e. that the income in question will be entitled to benefits in the first-mentioned State only when taxed in the other State, to the condition that the income must be so taxed in that other State within a specified period of time from the time the income arises in the first-mentioned State."
Paragraph 26.1 was added with the heading preceding it on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 109: Corresponds to paragraph 26.2 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 26.2 was renumbered as paragraph 109 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 26.2 was added with the preceding heading on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 110: Corresponds to paragraph 27.9 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 27.9 was amended and renumbered as paragraph 110 and the preceding heading was moved with it by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017. After
28 January 2003 and until 21 November 2017, paragraph 27.9 read as follows:
"27.9 Switzerland does not share the view expressed in paragraph 7 according to which the purpose of double taxation conventions is to prevent tax avoidance and evasion. Also, this view seems to contradict the footnote to the Title of the Model Tax Convention. With respect to paragraph 22.1, Switzerland believes that domestic tax rules on abuse of tax conventions must conform to the general provisions of tax conventions, especially where the convention itself includes provisions intended to prevent its abuse. With respect to paragraph 23, Switzerland considers that controlled foreign corporation legislation may, depending on the relevant concept, be contrary to the spirit of Article 7."
Paragraph 27.9 was added on 28 January 2003 by the report entitled "The 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 28 January 2003.
Paragraph 111: Corresponds to paragraph 28 as it read before 21 November 2017. On that date, paragraph 28 was renumbered as paragraph 111 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 28 was amended on 29 April 2000 by the report entitled "The 2000 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on
29 April 2000. After 23 July 1992 and until 29 April 2000, paragraph 28 read as follows:
"28. The United States reserves the right to tax its citizens and residents (with certain exceptions) without regard to the Convention."
Paragraph 28 as it read after 23 July 1992 corresponded to paragraph 11 of the 1977 Model Convention, which was renumbered as paragraph 28 by the report entitled "The Revision of the 1977 Model Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 23 July 1992.
Paragraph 11 was added when the 1977 Model Convention was adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977.
Paragraph 112: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 113: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 114: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 115: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 116: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
Paragraph 117: Added on 21 November 2017 by the report entitled "The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention", adopted by the OECD Council on 21 November 2017.
***
Contact us and speak with an international tax lawyer: https://yourinternationaltaxlawyers.net
Discover our courses
COURSE 1 TAX HAVENS COURSE - GOING GLOBAL COURSE - BUSINESS INTERNATIONALIZATION COURSE
https://yourinternationaltaxlawyers.net/index.php/course-1
COURSE 2 Learn 10 hidden strategies used by elites and multimillionaires to reduce their taxes, and start saving taxes right NOW, even without moving abroad
https://yourinternationaltaxlawyers.net/index.php/course-2
***